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Developers of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) gaming software are making remarkable 
strides in increasing the realism of their software. This realism has caught the attention of the 
training community, which has traditionally sought system and operational replication in training 
systems such as flight simulators. Since games are designed and marketed for entertainment and 
not designed for training of tasks, questions exist about the effectiveness of games as a training 
system in achieving the desired transfer of skills to the actual environment. Numerous studies 
over the past ten years have documented that PC-based simulation training environments can 
offer effective training for certain types of training, especially aircraft piloting tasks. Desktop 
games have been evaluated from a case study approach for use in aviation  training  (Proctor, et 
al., 2004) and education  planning and evaluating small unit tactics) (Proctor, et al., 2002) with 
positive results.  
Based on the review of selected studies in this area, PC-based simulator platforms have 
been found to have a positive training impact on cognitive skills (as opposed to psycho-motor 
skills). Specifically, the literature review has identified that skill sets involved in team resource 
management, intra- and inter-team coordination, and tactical team maneuvers have been shown 
to benefit from the use of PC-based simulation training. 
 The purpose of this research was to evaluate the training transfer associated with a 
Tactical Decision-making game, using Close Combat: First to Fight as a case study.  The null 
hypothesis tested was that traditional field training is equivalent to virtual training combined 
with field training. Measurements of the subjects’ performance in live training were recorded.  
Additionally, self assessment questionnaires were administered.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Developers of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) game software are making remarkable 
strides in increasing the realism of their software. This realism has caught the attention of the 
training community, which has traditionally sought system and operational replication in training 
systems such as flight simulators. Yet questions exist about the effectiveness of games as 
training systems in achieving the desired transfer of skills to the actual environment. Using a 
case study approach, this research will explore these questions. 
 The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps (USMC) have placed a great emphasis on training 
Sailors and Marines in virtual environments. In particular, a suite of Tactical Decision-making 
Simulations (TDS), most developed under the Office of Naval Research and transitioned to the 
Deployable Virtual Training Environment (DVTE), is comprised of wargames using synthetic 
environments. The wargames incorporated into DVTE include Close Combat: Marine from 
Atomic Games, Tactical Operations Marine Corps by I.L. Holdridge, Virtual Battlefield Systems 
from Bohemia Interactive Studio, Forward Observer Personal Computer Simulation from the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Ambush! from BBN Technologies, Close Combat: First to Fight 
from Destineer Studios, Logistics TDS from Technologies To Be, Inc., and MAGTF-XXI from 
MÄK Technologies. Soon to be added are an Anti-Terrorism TDS and a Joint Terminal Attack 
Controller TDS, both from Destineer Studios. 
While few would argue that games or other personal computer (PC)-based training 
systems could replace existing field training, the TDSs can provide the opportunity to improve a 
Small Unit Leader's level of knowledge, decision-making ability, and communication skills 
within his team in order to prepare for and to augment live training. This is a relatively 
inexpensive solution that will provide a new training capability to the USMC. The purpose of 
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this research is to evaluate the training transfer associated with this type of game, using one TDS 
as a case study. Rigorous experimentation measures the subjects’ improvement in cognition 
when confronted with decision-making tasks. This experimentation will compare, assess, and 
report on training value achieved through traditional field training versus the benefits of virtual 
training combined with field training. 
Current demographic trends indicate that during the 21st century, an ever-increasing 
percentage of the world’s population will reside in urban areas. The USMC has identified the 
potential for conflict in urban areas and is attempting to rectify its deficiencies in this arena. “We 
have been working diligently to ensure that we can fight the three-block war, because we believe 
in our heart and souls that that is the conflict of the 21st century.” (Krulak, 1999) The current 
focus of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s (MCWL) experiments is to develop tactics, 
techniques, and procedures that can reduce the casualty percentage below 30% in the urban 
environment. “The urban environment is the most-likely battlefield in the near future. 
Developing means to deal with this unique environment is essential.” (MCWL, 2001) The 30% 
percent casualty rate is a number that, historically, has rendered a unit ineffective in combat. 
Daily rates of casualty and illness incidence sustained in the re-taking of the city 
of Hue during the North Vietnamese Tet offensive of 1968 were examined. The 
daily wounded rate for the U.S. Marine battalions involved was 17.5 per 1,000 
strength, and ranged from 1.6 to 45.5. The killed-in-action rate per 1,000 strength 
per day was 2.2, and ranged from 0.0 to 9.6. The wounded rate during the urban 
warfare of Hue was three times higher than during the high intensity battle for 
Okinawa and sixfold the wounded rate during normal Marine operations at the 
peak of the Vietnam conflict. The disease and non-battle injury rate remained 
steady over the course of the Hue operation at approximately 1.0 per 1,000 
strength per day. (Department of the Navy, 2000) 
 
 Because of the compartmental terrain of the urban environment, Military Operations on 
Urban Terrain (MOUT) truly becomes a small unit’s battle. The decisions of the small unit 
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leader have the potential to create strategic consequences for the U. S. military in the region. 
This logic led then-Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles Krulak to coin the term 
“strategic corporal: The individual who at the very lowest level of the Marine Corps is going to 
have to deal with issues of strategic importance.” (Krulak, 1999) 
Any leader’s ability to make competent decisions is derived from two major factors: how 
well he has been trained and educated and how much experience he has with a particular 
situation. The typical USMC squad leader is a corporal with less than four years in the service 
(even though the USMC Table of Organization calls for a sergeant). His formal education 
generally is limited to high school and his training has consisted of recruit training and the basic 
infantry skills learned at the Infantry Training Battalion. He most likely has no experience 
leading a small unit, particularly in a MOUT environment. 
Most Marine Corps infantry training today is focused on the Infantry Battalion or 
Battalion Landing Team (as part of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) 
(MEU(SOC))). As the building blocks of the battalion, Infantry Companies are trained for 
particular aspects of combat—one company for mechanized operations, one company for 
helicopterborne operations, and one company for special operations such as in-extremis hostage 
rescue, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, and non-combatant evacuation. 
As a result, while the battalion and company staffs are training for these missions and 
learning to conduct planning and write operation orders, the fire teams and squads are 
conducting field days; pulling mess duty; performing preventive maintenance on weapons, 
vehicles, and equipment; and going to the rifle range for annual requalification. Those few who 
are lucky enough to attend the training “represent” squads or even platoons. The impact, as one 
could guess, is that there is a gap in training at the lowest levels of the organization. When fire 
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teams and squads do go to the field for training, the learning curve is so steep that they cannot 
take full advantage of the training opportunities. 
Individual combatants and small teams want – and need – to be active participants in the 
fight. Soldiers at the point-of-the-spear do things – not just talk about them. At this level, 
warfighting systems run on functional objects, rather than sophisticated comments. The training 
immersion does not need to be total sensory. In fact, it may be only mental immersion. Thus, the 
current approaches of using simulation immersion caves and other enclosures may not be the 
answer. (Cosby & Severinghaus, 2003) 
While the company commanders and platoon commanders are responsible for the 
training and preparedness of their units, the training task ultimately falls to the squad leaders and 
fire team leaders to ensure that their Marines are ready. The squad leaders and fire team leaders 
need a training system to assist them in preparing their Marines so that when field training is 
available, they can take the greatest advantage of it. Further, while these units are deployed 
aboard ship as part of a MEU(SOC), they need a tool to keep the Marines’ skills refreshed as 
they tend to atrophy during long deployments at sea. As stated in the 2001 Report of the Defense 
Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Training Superiority & Training Surprise, “Future training 
must be delivered to the individual, to units, and to joint forces, when it is needed, not in the 
schoolhouse after which there is time for proficiency to decay. Training must be applied over and 
over again as the composition of the units and joint forces changes and as skills erode over time.” 
(DSB 2001) 
Time is a major constraint on the training of infantry squads and fire teams. What little 
time is available for training must be optimized. Further, a training system that is so enjoyed by 
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the Marines that they would use their off-duty hours to take advantage of it, would supplement 
the training hours available. 
 The other major constraint on any infantry training system (in fact, any USMC training 
system) is cost. The USMC receives only about six per cent of the Department of Defense’s 
budget, yet has the highest operational tempo of any service. This translates to very little funding 
available for training systems. Therefore, the training system selected must be extremely cost 
effective. 
Acquisition cost and hardware costs are the least important factor when 
considering acquiring or developing a simulation; unless, of course, a simulation 
requires a Cray computer. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) are the real costs 
associated with using a combat simulation. If a combat simulation requires a host 
of analysts, data base managers, war gamers, controllers, or programmers to make 
it work, it will not be cost effective. Cost effectiveness is closely related to the 
architecture, which in turn drives the ease of use and ease of modification. 
Interactive war games that require 25 to 100 players will not be used often enough 
to make them cost effective. (Might, 1993) 
 
Advanced modeling and simulations for games, entertainment, manufacturing, 
education, the U.S. Department of Defense, finance, and other applications will 
grow with the development of integrated media systems incorporating software 
and hardware development at many levels. Integrated media systems will 
powerfully impact all fields of inquiry and technology. Integrated media systems 
of the future will seamlessly combine digital video, digital audio, computer 
animation, text, and graphics into common displays in such a way as to allow for 
mixed media creation, dissemination, and interactive access in real time. 
(Gundersen, 1997) 
 
While M. Gundersen’s point is well taken and, in fact, is good news for both the civilian 
and military communities, it in no way detracts from the long-term viability of the technology 
proposed for the Fire Team Cognitive Skills Trainer. Technology advances will continue to 
speed along (just ask anybody who buys a new computer—by the time the system is out of the 
box and set up, something new and faster is available!). However, the technology proposed here 
satisfies not only the requirements for the training system today but well into the future. 
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Operation and Maintenance costs are minimal. As COTS systems, the hardware is covered for 
three years by the manufacturer’s warranty and the software has manufacturer’s support 
available. The cognitive skills that will be addressed by the system will remain the same 
regardless of technological advances in computer systems or even in the weapons to be used by 
the Marines. “Technology is not a panacea. Technology cannot – and will not – replace the 
Marine staples of resolute leadership, esprit-de-corps and skill-at-arms that have won battles for 
more than 200 years.” (MCWL, 2001) 
The urgency of the foregoing, combined with the minimal amount of funding available to 
provide this training, points out the need for a readily available, easily modifiable, COTS 
solution to training the strategic corporal and his Marines. One possible answer is PC-based 
commercial, “first-person shooter” wargames. 
 While there are numerous references available discussing simulations and wargaming, 
precious little addresses small unit training and the validation of training transfer. For example, 
War Gaming: In Need of Context (Schwalbe, 1993) discusses conflict in Central Europe 
involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, The Korean 
Peninsula, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, The Balkan Peninsula, and Eastern Europe. Current 
Applications, Trends, and Organizations in U.S. Military Simulation and Gaming (Oswalt, 1993) 
talks about Janus, Brigade/ Battalion Simulation, Warfighters’ Simulation 2000, Combined Arms 
Tactical Training [Army], Joint Air Combat Training System [Air Force], Battle Force 
Team/Tactical Training System [Navy], and WAR BREAKER [Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency]. Even Military Simulation and Gaming Organizations (Oswalt, 1993) lists 
producers of commercial military simulations for hobbyists that bear names such as F-16 
Combat Pilot, M-1 Tank Platoon, and Carriers at War. 
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 Although Principles for the Design and Selection of Combat Simulations (Might, 1993) is 
also directed at higher levels of simulations, the principles listed may be entirely applicable to 
selecting a small unit simulation as well: 
1. Architecture—a simulation must be flexible as user needs change, and its 
structure must allow cost effective use and maintenance; 
2. User needs—what the simulation is to be used for and how it is to be used; 
3. Integration—how the simulation will interface with other simulations that are 
relevant to the user, and other models that may potentially interface with the 
simulation. 
The PC gaming and simulation industry, largely driven by recent technology advances 
and consumer economics, has dramatically driven cost down while improving the quality and 
realism of games and desktop simulation technologies. Just nine years ago, computer simulation 
games and simulations were judged to be low on fidelity, interface, and immersion dimensions 
(Thurman & Matoon, 1994). Compared to the games of today, they could not faithfully represent 
the real world nor did they have very natural interfaces, and the feeling of being immersed in the 
simulation was accomplished only through imagination. All that has changed with the significant 
strides we have seen in the development of graphics and animation software, artificial 
intelligence, computer interfaces, and networking. 
The most noticeable advances in PC games have come in the area of computer graphics. 
“Images on today’s $400 game consoles rival or surpass those on $50,000 computers from only a 
few years ago (Laird, 2000).”Realistic images combined with more realistic controls allow the 
participant to feel, through multiple senses, the feeling of “being there.” In the future, virtual 
reality technology will expand gaming to include “the participant’s entire body within a synthetic 
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environment rather than simply providing a joystick or other external interface device as today’s 
computer games do.” (Thurman & Matoon, 1994) 
Just as graphics and computer interface advances have produced more realistic 
simulations of the physical world, artificial intelligence (AI) is resulting in more realistic 
modeling of game characters. Artificial intelligence at the human level can be applied to tactical 
enemies, partners, support characters, and even units of individuals, such as platoons (Laird & 
van Lent, 1999). As AI research progresses, game characters will possess qualities that are 
increasingly more human-like. Even now, AI researchers at the University of Michigan have 
created an enemy “bot” for the Quake II game that is essentially a real-time expert system that 
has multiple goals and extensive tactics and knowledge of the game. The Quake II bot tries to 
anticipate the actions of the human players, tracks down its enemy, and sets ambushes (van Lent, 
et al., 1999). 
Several studies have suggested that PC simulation games can produce transfer of 
cognitive skills that have application to a wide variety of domain-specific tasks. In fact, several 
PC games have been found to be advantageous for conducting psychological research in the 
cognitive processes involved in problem-solving (Porter, 1998), strategy development (Gonzales 
& Cathcart, 1995), and changes in neural maps (Tallal, et al., 1996). 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Because of the nature of the military application area as well as the diverse nature of 
gaming systems, consideration of both military and gaming system literature is appropriate. 
Some members of the education community question the conclusion that games can be 
directly applied to training tasks with a positive effect. For example, McCarty explored gaming 
environments to assess learning activities in computer games. He found that his subjects, during 
their gaming playing, did not learn anything in depth about the underlying model of the game. 
Their clicking and exploring of the game was kept on the surface level. 
Simulations appear to be of little educational value if the model cannot be 
accessed.  This argues for close teacher direction if the use of the simulation in 
history is to be educationally valid on terms of measurable ‘knowledge’ 
outcomes.  From this research, computer games in general do not appear to offer a 
pedagogic environment.  The focus for the player is to play and win the game—
the research subjects were concerned to know ‘how to win’.  The notion of 
learning whilst playing was never explicit or implicit in anything the students 
said. (McCarty, 2001) 
 
His research suggests that game play is a distraction from learning and that games do not 
necessarily teach the knowledge that is actually embedded in the models themselves.  
Greenfield, a professor of psychology at the University of California at Los Angeles, has 
studied the effects of video games on players’ minds.  She believes that video games may be the 
first example of a computer technology that is having a socializing effect on a generation and 
that individuals seem to be developing better iconic representation skills than the person who 
was socialized by the older media of print and radio. Among her findings in this research and 
subsequent research in 1996, “Video game skills transfer to and lead to greater comprehension of 
scientific simulations, due to increased ability to decode the iconic representation of computer 
graphics (Greenfield, 1984)”. Also among Greenfield’s findings are: 
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• Playing video games augments skill in reading visual images as 
representations of three-dimensional space (representational competence). 
This is a combination of several competencies, including partnering with 
the computer in the construction of the representation, using the joystick 
(or other controller) as a “distanced” representational tool, working in 
real-time, multidimensional visual-spatial skills, and mental maps. 
• Skill in computer games enhances, and is a causal factor in, other thinking 
skills such as the skill of mental paper folding (i.e. picturing the results of 
various origami-like folds in your mind without actually doing them.). 
What is important, she finds, is this is a cumulative skill—there is no 
effect on mental paper folding from playing the game for only a few 
hours. These effects were found in other studies as well. 
• Because no one tells you the rules in advance, video games enhance the 
skills of “rule discovery” through observation, trial and error, and 
hypothesis testing. In Greenfield’s words, “the process of making 
observations, formulating hypotheses and figuring out the rules governing 
the behavior of a dynamic representation is basically the cognitive process 
of inductive discovery … the thought process behind scientific thinking.” 
Computer games, she finds, require this skill. 
• Video game skills transfer to and lead to greater comprehension of 
scientific simulations, due to increased ability to decode the iconic 
representation of computer graphics. 
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• Playing video games enhances players’ skills at “divided attention” tasks, 
such as monitoring multiple locations simultaneously, by helping them 
appropriately adjust their “strategies of attentional deployment.” Players 
get faster at responding to both expected and unexpected stimuli. 
(Prensky, 2001) 
Pillay, Brownlee, and Wilss (1999), noticing that recreational computer games are 
becoming an increasingly significant part of students’ lives, conducted an exploratory study 
aimed at understanding the cognitive processes that students engage in when playing computer 
games. Using Nintendo’s Pilot Wings, they demonstrated that players practiced “complex 
cognitive processes such as interpreting explicit and implicit information, inductive reasoning, 
metacognitive analysis, and problem solving.” They went on to say that PC games have been 
shown to enhance soldiers’ decision-making skills through practice with variation. 
Homan (1998) proposed that low cost, low fidelity PC aviation simulations could be used 
to enhance pilots’ situational awareness (SA). SA is the process the pilot uses to maintain a 
“continuously updated mental picture of the flight at hand.” Homan suggested that various 
scenarios in PC simulations could assist the pilot in identifying and handling unusual situations 
by training the pilot to be aware of clues in the situation. 
Several recent experiments may enable one to draw some conclusions regarding the value 
of PC-based games for cognitive transfer. 
 1.  Interoperable Training through a Simulation Game (Proctor, et al., 2002) 
 Thirteen Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets conducted training using 
Combat Mission: Beyond Overlord™. Each cadet completed a 43-question survey after training. 
The “cadets indicated in a statistically significant degree (Wilcoxon sign test) a number of 
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advantages to the game.” Further, the cadets indicated “that using this commercial-off-the-shelf 
software is a viable, low-cost option for training tactical concepts at the platoon and company 
level.  Specifically, cadets indicated the game system would be beneficial ‘for teaching and 
practicing tactical concepts and troop-leading procedures to Basic Course officers at a combat-
arms branch school.’” 
 2.  Low Cost PC-Gaming and Simulation Research: Doctrinal Survey (Tarr, Morris, and 
Singer, 2002) 
 Tarr, et al., conducted a focus group type of evaluation with Subject Matter Experts 
(SME) to determine the doctrinal correctness of two PC games with potential for use in training. 
One of these, Rogue Spear: Covert Ops™, could be used for training, according to the SMEs, “in 
spite of the doctrinal problems, as long as trainers attended to those negative aspects present in 
the training vignette.” Furthermore, the “SMEs were open to using the game in an early training 
stage for new troops.” 
 3.  Factors in Team Performance in a Virtual Squad Environment (Barlow, et al., 2004) 
 An experiment was conducted to explore the use of a first person shooter, Operation 
Flashpoint™, in a competitive team environment and to determine the factors that correlate to 
the success or failure of a team. Among the factors considered was whether the participants used 
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) or a heuristic process. (“NDM is a theory about the way 
humans make decisions under the constraints of incomplete knowledge, time pressures, a 
dynamic environment, and high costs for errors; and appears to encapsulate many situations 
faced by a military commander.”) 
 The experiment was conducted as a competition at the Australian Defence Force 
Academy. Eight teams competed, five teams of officer cadets and midshipmen, two teams of 
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officers taking undergraduate courses, and one team of staff civilians. At the conclusion of the 
match, each individual was asked to rate five factors on a scale from 1 (not significant) to 10 
(most significant) that had been important to team victory during the matches. “Team 
communication was seen as the most important (9.3) with individual skills, and situational 
awareness also being rated as very important (8.0 – 8.3).” 
 The results of the players’ situational awareness show the rarity of complete knowledge 
of the disposition of friendly forces and even less knowledge of the enemy. This lack of 
complete situational awareness, combined with the participants’ perception of a very rapid pace 
of action and the high cost of mistakes “describe the key conditions of an NDM environment. 
When this is combined with the data regarding the decision-making processes of the participants 
– the strong use of intuition as well as assigned roles to reduce the complexity – the proposition 
that a [first person shooter] is a good vehicle for the investigation of NDM theory, seems well 
founded.” 
4. Child’s Play? Coercing a COTS Game into a Military Experimentation Tool 
(Morrison & Barlow, 2004) 
 Focused on experimentation, the Virtual Infantry Section Experiment (VISE) evaluated 
possible future force structures in the Australian Army but also explored the potential of Virtual 
Battlefield Systems™ as a tactical training system. This experiment determined, through survey 
responses, that Virtual Battlefield Systems™ appeared to be a good tool for the utility of the two-
dimensional map for tactical appreciation, for representing section scenarios, for tactical training 
potential, and for teamwork and subunit training. Some valuable recommendations as a result of 
the experiment were: 
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• “Optimum COTS games for Defence are modifiable, extendable products that naturally 
support customisation. Mandatory features include a scenario editor, the ability to modify 
aspects of the simulation engine (typically the look and performance of game entities and 
weapons), and the ability to import custom terrain and vegetation.” 
• “Training outcomes and methodology must be developed before the implementation of a 
product.” 
• “Directing staff (preferably military) are an essential requirement when conducting 
training of Defence personnel in a COTS simulation.” 
5. Dismounted Infantry Virtual Environment (DIVE) (Henegan, 2005) 
 “Trials, conducted by the Ministry of Defence and the defence technology company 
QinetiQ, found that soldiers who had played urban war games on computers were less likely to 
suffer casualties and completed tasks quicker during live exercises.” 
6. Commercial Computer Games in the Australian Department of Defence (Carpenter & 
White, 2005) 
 The University of New South Wales conducted a literature review and evaluation of 
commercial games on behalf of the Australian Defence Simulation Office. “With due caution we 
are therefore formally opening the door for commercial computer games to be considered as 
potential contributors to the Defence simulation arena. We see the many benefits while 
recognising the current risks and limitations that such products have to offer.” 
 While these articles provide encouragement for using simulations for cognitive skill 
learning, none of them show any evidence that the general cognitive skills taught in the 
simulation generalized to other domains or situations. Nor do they give us criteria for or 
taxonomy of computer games as they relate to systems for training. Thurman and Dunlap (2000), 
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in their review of military and commercial applications of simulation training, point out the 
paucity of data related to the training effectiveness of simulations and lack of data on specific 
transfer of training. They suggest, however, that this state of affairs may be explained by the 
movement toward new models of training evaluation, models that emphasize general transfer of 
skills that give the trainee the ability to generalize and respond to situations that do not exactly 
match those for which they were trained. 
Taxonomies 
Before computer games, Caillois divided games in to four classes: Competition, Chance, 
Simulation, and Movement (Caillois, 1958). In his book, Crawford identified five major types of 
games: board games, card games, athletic games, children’s games, and computer games 
(Crawford, 1984). Amory et al. (1998) used four commercial games representing four game 
types (simulation, adventure, strategy, and “shoot-em-up”) to examine the game types most 
suitable for teaching biology. First- and second-year biology students preferred the adventure 
and strategy games to the other game types and reported that, in their opinion, logic, memory, 
visualization, and problem solving were the most important skills used in these games. The 
authors suggested a model for the design of educational games based on the game elements 
described in their study. Since the turn of the Millennium, computer games are generally 
categorized into eight genres: 
Action Games began with the classic “twitch” games of the arcades and home 
video consoles: Super Mario, Sonic the Hedgehog et al. The category includes the 
old “side scroller” games, maze games (PacMan), platform jumping games (e.g. 
Gekko), falling things you have to shoot (Missile Command), car races and 
chases. Obviously this is the category of the shoot-em-ups like Doom, Quake, 
Duke Nukem, Half-Life and Unreal Tournament. 
 
Adventure Games are the “find your way around the unknown world, pick up 
objects and solve puzzles” games. These are among the earliest of computer 
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games; Adventure was played on mainframes. Zork is a classic of the genre. 
Present day adventure games include Myst and Riven on the PC and Zelda, the 
Ocarina of Time on Nintendo 
 
Fighting Games are a lot of what you see in the lobbies of movie theaters. Two 
characters, drawn from a stable of hundreds, battle each other till one is wiped 
out. All these games are really doing is matching up two “moves” at the same 
time, to see which wins., But the speed is intense, and the moves are athletic, 
balletic and fantastical. They are typically captured by motion capture sensors on 
dancers and real martial arts fighters, and the goal appears to be to combine 
outlandish fantasy in the characters with realism of the computer graphics. The 
classic example: Mortal Kombat. Modern example: Virtua Fighter MMMCIII.  
 
Puzzle games are just that. Problems to be solved, typically visual, stripped of all 
story pretense. The classic example: Tetris. Modern example: Devil Dice 
 
Role Playing Games (RPGs) are generally some form of “Dungeons and 
Dragons” brought to the computer screen. They are mostly mediaeval in their 
imagery and involve quests usually to rescue someone or something. You play a 
character, which has a “type” (human, orc, elf, wizard, etc) and a set of individual 
characteristics you assign it. You acquire equipment and experience via action 
and fighting. Things like spells are a big deal. The classic example: the Ultima 
series. Modern example: EverQuest. RPGs are most often played online with 
others. 
 
Simulation Games are about flying or driving things (often military) or building 
worlds like Sim City and The Sims, or, increasingly, running companies (Start-up)  
 
Sports Games are the one category where the content, rather than the game play 
is the determining factor. Most are action games where you can control one or 
more players at a time. Sports games are getting so photorealistic that on the latest 
consoles you’d almost swear you were watching real players on television. There 
also exist less action- and more statistics-oriented sports games like fantasy 
baseball, as well as action sports games, especially in arcades, where you control 
the game via a realistic piece of sports equipment such as skis, a surfboard, or 
even — only in Japan — a rotating kayak paddle. 
 
Strategy games are typically about being in charge of something big – an army, 
or an entire civilization, and making it evolve the way you want, either on your 
own or more often against opponents. The classic example: Civilization. Modern 
example: Roller Coaster Tycoon. (Prensky, 2001) 
 
Numerous studies over the past ten years have documented that PC-based simulation 
training environments can offer effective training for certain types of training, especially aircraft 
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piloting tasks. Based on the review of selected studies in this area, PC-based simulator platforms 
have been found to have a positive training impact on cognitive skills (as opposed to psycho-
motor skills). Specifically, the literature review has identified that skill sets involved in team 
resource management, intra- and inter-team coordination, and tactical team maneuvers have been 
shown to benefit from the use of PC-based simulation training. In addition, some researchers 
have indicated that the use of PC-based training can increase the confidence level of students 
(Rantz, 1998). 
 Many taxonomies exist for organizational behaviors. Of the several reviewed, only three, 
“Use of networked simulations as a context to measure team competencies,” “Structure and 
Process Organizational Taxonomy (SPOT),” and “A Basic Classification Structure” fit the topic 
of Military Team Performance for the size of team that I am evaluating. 
Currently available taxonomies of organizational behavior are not uniformly clear 
as to the unit of analysis that is being used (i.e., is the analysis being conducted in 
terms of individuals, teams/groups, and/or units/organizations). Some taxonomies 
include concepts that are clearly transferable from one unit of analysis to another 
(e.g., Miller, 1965a, 1965b, 1965c). Others clearly differentiate the unit of 
analysis but are not completely clear about the distinctions between levels of 
abstraction (i.e., specification in terms of behavior or function (e.g., Indik, 1968; 
Indik & Berrien, 1963). Still others provide useful insight into important types of 
organizational “variables” with no clear description of how these variables are 
realized in individuals, teams/groups, and/or units/organizations (e.g., Baudhuin, 
1985; Sells, 1968). (Cameron & Urzi, 1999) 
 
In my experimentation I will be focusing on the Marine Corps Fire Team and Squad 
level. The composition of a standard Marine Corps Squad is as shown in Figure 1: 
















Figure 1: Composition of a Marine Corps Rifle Squad 
 Table 1, adapted from “Taxonomies of Organizational Behaviors: A Synthesis” 
(Cameron & Urzi, 1999), demonstrates the relationships between the taxonomy that I propose to 
use and the three taxonomies mentioned above that fit the topic of Military Team Performance 
for the size of team that I am evaluating. 
Table 1 
Relationships between Taxonomies for Military Team Performance 
O’Neil, et al. Appel, et al. Indik Woodman 
Communication Communication Communication Communication 
 Control Control Control 
Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination 
Interpersonal Socialization/Integration Group socialization-integration 
processes 
Cooperation 
Decision Making Managership Supervision Cognition 
Leadership Leadership  Command 
Adaptability Degree of flux Adaptability to change (Coordination) 
 Conflict control processes Conflict control process (Command, 
Cooperation) 
 Role specification Mutual understanding of 
reciprocal role relations 
(Command, 
Cooperation) 
 Degree of bureaucracy Degree of bureaucracy (Command) 








 Relations with social 
environment 
Amount of communication 
interaction of members of the 
group with non members for 
organizational purposes 
(Communication) 
  Distribution of communication 
interaction by members of the 
group with non members for 
organizational purposes 
(Communication) 
 Externally imposed change  (Command, 
Cooperation) 
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To measure teamwork processes, we used the taxonomy of teamwork process 
from prior work. The taxonomy has six teamwork processes: (a) adaptability, 
recognizing problems and responding appropriately; (b) communication, the 
exchange of clear and accurate information; (c) coordination, organizing team 
activities to complete a task on time; (d) decision-making, using available 
information to make decisions; (e) interpersonal, interacting cooperatively with 
other team members; and (f) leadership, providing structure and direction for the 
team. Our prior research showed statistically significant positive relationships 
between decision making and team performance on a negotiation task (final 
contract offer and negotiation style), and a significant negative correlation 
between interpersonal processes and whether an agreement was reached. (O’Neil 
et al., 1997) 
 
As I have proposed, training at the military squad and fire team level must focus on the 
team performance behaviors of command, control, communications, coordination, cooperation, 
and cognition.  
• The squad leader and fire team leaders need to be able to: 
o Command the squad or fire team through the use of clear, concise operation 
orders. 
o Control the movements and actions of the fire teams or individuals, both verbally 
and non-verbally. 
o Coordinate the efforts of the fire teams or individuals. (Another aspect of 
coordination is developing and maintaining shared mental models, which applies 
to all members of the group to enable adaptability.) 
• All members of the group must be able to: 
o use their powers of cognition (decision-making) to accomplish the mission. 
o Communicate distinctly and succinctly up and down the chain of command and 
with one another. 
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o Cooperate with one another to maximize the combat power of their combined 
numbers (the holistic factor), as well as to share resources and control internal 
conflict. 
 Table 2 shows the relationships between these team performance behaviors that appear to 
have potential for training via computer games and the game genres listed above. 
Table 2 











X X X X X X 
Adventure X X     
Fighting       
Puzzle      X 
Role Playing X X X X X X 
Simulation   X X X X 
Sports  X X X X  
Strategy X X    X 
X = Team performance behaviors that appear to have potential for training via the computer game genre indicated 
 
Team Competencies 
 Aside from taxonomies, “team competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities--KSAs) are 
vital to understanding and evaluating team performance in dynamic environments” (Cannon-
Bowers & Salas, 1998). More recently, “Salas and Cannon-Bowers (2000) summarized 
teamwork dimensions into three primary categories: cognitions, skills and attitudes. Cognitions 
(or knowledge) include cue strategy associations, task specific team-mate characteristics, shared 
task models, team mission, objectives, norms, and resources, task sequencing, accurate task 
models and problem models, team role interaction patterns, teamwork skills, boundary spanning 
roles, and team orientation. Behaviours (or skills) consist of adaptability, shared situational 
awareness, mutual performance monitoring, motivating team members/team leadership, mission 
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analysis, communication, decision-making, assertiveness, interpersonal coordination, and 
conflict resolution. Last, attitudes embody motivation, collective efficacy/potency, shared vision, 
team cohesion, mutual trust, collective orientation and importance of teamwork” (Paris, Salas, & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2000). And, according to Ioerger, “Team competencies are those requirements 
that are needed for effective team performance. Team competencies can be divided into: 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Knowledge refers to factual information about the domain, 
mission, and team structure that team members must know in order to interact effectively. For 
example, they need to know who plays what role, and what the capabilities of their teammates 
are. Skills refer to the teamwork processes, such as information exchange, load balancing, and 
conflict resolution. And attitudes refer to the motivational determinants of team members’ 
choices, such as orientation toward teamwork, leadership, and willingness to accept advice or 
help” (Ioerger, 2003). Table 3 provides a summary: 




Knowledge/Cognition cue strategy associations 
task specific team-mate characteristics 
shared task models 
team mission, objectives, norms, and resources 
task sequencing 
accurate task models and problem models 
team role interaction patterns 
teamwork skills 
boundary spanning roles 
team orientation 
factual information about the domain 
factual information about the mission 
factual information about the team structure 
Skills/Behaviors adaptability 
shared situational awareness 
mutual performance monitoring 














collective orientation and importance of teamwork 
leadership 
willingness to accept advice or help 
 
Training Teams in Virtual Environments 
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Navy and USMC have placed a great emphasis on training 
Sailors and Marines in virtual environments. “Successful problem solving performance in this 
environment requires the integration of multiple knowledge formats and, thus, mimics more 
complex operational team tasks. For example, trainees have to master, not only declarative 
knowledge (e.g. range and power of their assets) and procedural knowledge (e.g. how to launch 
an asset or attack an enemy target), but also what we label strategic knowledge (i.e. how to apply 
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knowledge) and integrative knowledge (i.e. the ability to use multiple task-relevant cues to 
interpret a situation and choose an optimal strategy)” (Fiore, et al., 2002). 
In “Distributed coordination space: toward a theory of distributed team process and 
performance,” Fiore, et al. discuss “the many issues surrounding distributed team performance, 
emphasizing how work characteristics associated with such teams may alter both the processes 
and the products emerging from distributed interaction. (Fiore, et al., 2003). While the focus of 
the article is teams whose members are physically distributed and are using “technology-
mediated communication” to interact, many of the points brought out can be applied to teams 
training in a virtual environment, even when the members are physically in the same room. For 
example, “At the level of the individual, when a team is co-located, interaction is transparent in 
that one is more easily able to assess a teammate’s actions (e.g. monitor visual cues for stress), 
but distribution produces potentially unique ways that individual members may be taxed. At the 
level of the team, interaction behaviours normally clear may become similarly opaque.” A team 
training in a virtual environment, with each team member reacting to the virtual environment as 
seen in the individual’s computer, may experience the same opacity of interaction. 
Fiore, et al. further argue that, “in addition to having the complex components associated 
with distributed team tasks influence interaction,” “team members must deal with an increased 
level of abstraction forced upon them by their distributed nature…” (Fiore, et al., 2003). I would 
argue that in addition to having the complex components associated with virtual team tasks 
influence interaction, team members must deal with an increased level of abstraction forced upon 
them by the virtual environment. Further, the statements “increased ambiguity and artificiality 
caused by the technology-mediated interaction” and “because information flow and format is 
technology-mediated, the rich visual, auditory and social array of cues normally accompanying 
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traditional team interaction are attenuated” apply to both the distributed environment and the 
virtual training environment. 
In a discussion of Information Management, Fiore, et al. suggest that information 
management can occur “at differing stages of team interaction, resulting in three forms of 
information management…. 
(1) Pre-process information management—any form of information parsing administered 
prior to actual interaction. 
(2) In-process information management—parsing information flow during task 
execution. 
(3) Post-process information management—information disseminated after interaction.” 
(Fiore, et al., 2003) 
These three stages mirror any military training or operational evolution: planning and 
briefing, execution, and de-briefing/after action review. The primary difference between this 
information management in a distributed environment and a co-located virtual environment 
training evolution is that the team conducts normal, “face-to-face” planning and briefing as well 
as de-briefing/after action review. Only during the execution phase is the information 
management similar in nature to a distributed environment.  
 Fiore, et al., also “discuss the more dynamic group factors resulting from team opacity 
and describe them in the context of the attitudes, behaviours and cognitions associated with team 
interaction in a distributed coordination space” (Fiore, et al., 2003). Similar to the Team 
Competencies discussed earlier, they list behaviors as team coordination, team adaptability, and 
team cooperation; attitudes as team trust, team cohesion, collective efficacy, and collective 
orientation; and cognition as working memory, memory activation, and long-term memory. Most 
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important to the discussion, I believe, is their assertion that, “Researchers propose that effective 
teams develop a shared understanding or shared mental model utilized to coordinate behaviours 
by anticipating and predicting each other’s needs and adapting to task demands (Cannon-Bowers 
et al. 1993). Furthermore, both implicit and explicit communication are important to team 
coordination and, for such coordination to develop, the team must have a shared mental 
model….coordination is often achieved via feedback mechanisms, particularly in non-routine 
situations. To the degree receiving and/or interpreting feedback is hindered, coordination may 
suffer” (Fiore, et al., 2003). This holds very true in the virtual environment as well, as team 
members do not have their normal capability of receiving implicit communication (hand and arm 
signals, facial expressions, subtle movements, etc.). 
 The implication of this decline in implicit cues is that team training in a virtual 
environment could result in teams altering their coordination attempts to include more explicit 
communication, thereby changing their normal operational procedures and causing negative 
training. This must be guarded against and some mechanism found to allow information 
management to proceed in as normal a manner as possible. This will require further research into 
the cognitive processes involved in team training in a virtual environment. 
 In my early experimentation, I did observe one Marine Fire Team Leader overcome this 
problem. In a field environment, Fire Team Leaders are very much “hands on.” If a Marine is not 
where the Fire Team Leader wants him, the Fire Team Leader may just grab the Marine by the 
backpack and physically move him. During the experiment, the Fire Team Leader was having 
difficulty explaining verbally to a Marine in his Fire Team exactly where in the Virtual 
Environment he was supposed to be positioned. The Fire Team Leader got up from his computer, 
     
26 
walked over to the other Marine, put his hand on the Marine’s shoulder, and pointed to the spot 
on his computer monitor, saying, “There! I want you right there!” 
In another military setting, what has proven to be the most effective method to train 
infantrymen in a MOUT environment is the use of “simunitions” (simulated munitions) in an 
actual MOUT facility. These simunitions are, in effect, an adaptation of the popular paint ball. 
Special magazines are used and the barrels of the Marines’ rifles are exchanged for special 
barrels that work with the simunitions. Simunitions are in high demand, and there is stiff 
competition among units for the use of MOUT facilities. The USMC does not have the necessary 
time, facilities, or equipment to fully meet the MOUT training requirement through traditional 
training methods. These shortfalls have been identified and both the Army and the USMC are 
working to provide more and improved MOUT facilities for operational units. However, 
construction of MOUT facilities is costly and time-consuming. Potential for supplementing 
MOUT training through games is suggested by the use computer games at the military academies 
to perform other small unit actions. As explained by Starling,  
 Computer games with titles such as “Steel Beasts” and “Star-Craft,” intended for 
home entertainment, are being used by the military academies to train the nation’s 
future generals and admirals. The games’ use by the prestigious military 
academies illustrates the increasing realism in computer games and the interest of 
military instructors in finding inexpensive and easily acquired teaching aids… 
(Starling, 2001) 
 
 Success at the academies infers that computer games may enable Marines to train on the 
cognitive skills required for MOUT. Marines may learn decision-making, communication skills, 
and unit Standing Operating Procedures before they go to the field. Because of the flexibility 
offered, units may be able to take advantage of this training when traditional training resources 
are unavailable. “[A]pplication of the gaming approach is the situation in which we want to teach 
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people … how to act in a new situation. … they have to learn skills. … After the learning or the 
practice, students will have to apply their new knowledge or skills in the real situation.” (Peters, 
1998) 
The USMC has previously identified PC-based games, such as Marine Doom, as having 
training value. To date, in addition to Marine Doom, the Delta Force 2, Rogue Spear, Rogue 
Spear: Urban Operations, and Operation Flashpoint games have been evaluated for their 
abilities to meet USMC infantry individual training standards. “Many existing hobby or 
commercial war games may have the potential to be applied within the defense community. 
However, in addition to resistance to using civilian products for military professional education 
or analysis, it also is often unknown whether commercial products would teach appropriate or 
realistic lessons.” (Oswalt, 1993) Therefore, we must carefully measure the training transfer of 
such systems to determine their validity. 
 Investigation of the use of games for military tasks is mostly found in technical reports.  
For example, Coalescent Technologies Corporation conducted research and experimentation on 
behalf of the U.S. Marine Corps and prepared the Fire Team Cognitive Skills Trainer (FTCST) 
Report in March 2001 (See Appendix A). The general research objective was to determine the 
utility of COTS PC-based, “first-person shooter” wargames for small unit MOUT cognitive 
skills training. A team of researchers (myself included) under the direction of Captain J. E. 
Smith, USMC conducted a technology demonstration and data collection effort with members of 
the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines (3/4) and supporting forces from Marine Corps Base Twentynine 
Palms, California. This unit was participating in the MCWL’s Project Metropolis at the former 
George Air Force Base in Victorville, California. One phase of Project Metropolis focuses on 
technology applications and MOUT training. Prior to the demonstration, the research team 
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selected and set up a networked sixteen-PC (desktop) system running Rogue Spear: Urban 
Operations in the multi-player mode. Several different scenarios (mission areas and locations) 
were selected for use. 
 Prerequisite research questions to support the general research included: 
  What is the experience level of the research participants with respect to (1) 
USMC (age, grade, time in service) and (2) PC-based games (types, length, enjoyment, ill 
effects)? 
  What lessons are learned regarding planning, intra-team communications, tactical 
awareness, movement techniques, and weapons employment/fire discipline during each game of 
the research experiment? 
  What are the participants’ opinions of the training system and the team’s 
performance at the conclusion of the research experiment?  
  What are the participants’ opinions of the training system’s value as a training 
tool after completing a field MOUT training evolution?  
  What is the best training methodology for maximum training transfer? 
Two of the more interesting results of the participants’ opinions of the training system 
were: 
After training on the FTCST but before live MOUT training:  How useful 
do you think this (PC-based game) training system will be for improving 
your abilities in MOUT? 
3.74 (out of 5) 
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After training on the FTCST and after live MOUT training:  How useful 
do you think the (PC-based game) training system was in improving your, 
or the participants’, overall ability/performance in MOUT? 
4.13 (out of 5) 
 This comparison is important in that it demonstrated the realization by the 
participants that the game-based training was even more valuable in the real-world 
training environment than they had thought it would be before experiencing the training 
environment. 
Objective Based Training 
Objective Based Training (OBT) defines, in a single source, all training objectives for an 
organization. OBT “defines what must be trained, how it will be trained, and how well it must be 
performed.” (COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1A) In the Instructional Systems Design process, 
OBT is associated with Terminal Learning Objectives and Enabling Learning Objectives. In fact, 
the US Navy Afloat Training Group Pacific “adopted the existing school house practice of 
curriculum development by creating a hierarchical structure of terminal and enabling objectives 
tied to individual and team measures of performance. This method was also designed to facilitate 
automated scenario generation, to support the development of ‘smart’ systems to objectively 
determine operator performance and provide recommendations for requisite remediation, and to 
provide a linkage between all levels of training.” (Acton, 1998) More recently, the US Navy 
Afloat Training Organizations similarly “implemented a process that quantifies training 
requirements, established clear training goals and associated metrics, and provides diagnostic 
training feedback. This systematic approach adapts accepted schoolhouse practices of curriculum 
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development by creating a hierarchical structure of objectives tied to individual and team 
measures of performance linked to Naval Mission Essential Tasks.” (Acton, 2001) 
Objective Based Training is often viewed as very passive. “Traditionally, Objective-
based training places the learner in a passive role while putting the instructor in total charge of 
defining the objectives, building the practices and developing the test. Behavioral and cognitive 
training are based on this learning theory. The teacher knows and you are expected to follow the 
lesson plan. You know the drill.” (Woodall, 2002) 
However, starting this year, the United States Military Academy (USMA) is “employing 
objective-based training, which is the new way of saying that we are training to standard, not to 
time. If a squad gets lost on patrol, or a unit fails to coordinate an attack, or a leader spends so 
much time planning that he runs out of time to execute, the unit ‘recocks’ and repeats the task.” 
(Lennox, 2003) 
In the USMA manifestation of OBT, mentoring is inferred.  The training evolutions must 
be mentored for two readily apparent reasons: (1) to prevent the training sessions from devolving 
into chaos—while MOUT in real life may be chaotic, chaos in the training environment is not 
conducive to after-action reviews which are critical to the learning process; and (2) to force the 
fire team leader and his Marines to go through the planning process, to deliberate on how they 
should solve the problem, and to review what they could have done better. It will also be 
important to use the same mentor for all groups within a particular evaluation occasion to 
eliminate the possibility of undue influence on the overall results. 
In some of industry, OBT is replacing the older training philosophy in which “there was 
too much emphasis on individual job elements and not enough on the whole job.” (Wright, 1990) 
Because of this, satisfactory performance on the job was not guaranteed by satisfactory 
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performance in training. “Two major characteristics of the OBT are: (1) training is based on 
actual job performance requirements, and (2) learning is independent of time and is worker 
paced. What this means is that the ability of the worker dictates the length of the training 
requirement as opposed to some preset management schedule….OBT requires that all job 
performance be described and reduced to written form. If management knows what an employee 
is to do on the job (the performance) and how well that job is to be done (the referenced 
criterion), then there is a high probability that the worker will do the job properly.” (Wright, 
1990) Of course, this only addresses Knowledge and Skills and ignores Attitudes. 
Events Based Approach to Training 
 In its simplest form, Events Based Approach to Training (EBAT) “provides a systematic 
approach for developing learning objectives, generating scenarios, measuring performance, and 
providing feedback. EBAT has been successfully used in a number of settings to establish 
effective learning environments which have in turn, resulted in improved performance.” (Oser, et 
al., 1997) Furthermore, the techniques of this approach “guide the design of training 
opportunities by systematically identifying and introducing events within training exercises that 
provide known opportunities to observe behaviors of interest. With EBAT, explicit links are 
maintained between training objectives, exercise design, and performance assessment.” 
(Fowlkes, et al., 1998) 
 When we consider team training using virtual environments, “EBAT provides the 
strategies, methods, and tools, which are essential for an effective learning environment…, in a 
structured and measurable format for training and testing specific KSAs. In order to precisely 
control, measure, and then benefit from user responses to events, a cyclical layout of EBAT has 
been established.” (Salas, et al., 1999) 
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 Naval Aviation Training Systems Division, through its Small Business Innovative 
Research program, has worked with a company called Cybernet to create a Training System 
called “OpenSkies.” “This system has closely integrated the EBAT with an OpenGL based 
virtual environment toolkit to produce a training scenario authoring system.” (Cybernet, 2005) 
Figure 2 is a diagram displaying this iterative approach. 
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Beyond its use in Virtual Environments, EBAT has been used successfully for designing 
team performance measurement tools for use in a distributed training environment. “In 
distributed team training, military teams train together in the same battlespace despite the 
physical separation. In these types of training environments, multiple users are located at 
multiple sites; consequently, the efficient and effective conduct of training is a challenge. One 
area that is particularly challenging is the measurement of team performance.” (Dwyer, Oser, 
Salas, & Fowlkes, 1999) 
 “Event-based techniques do not depend on the chance interactions among trainees and 
other elements of the scenario for training; rather, they create the requirement to act.” (Fowlkes, 
et al., 1998) 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the training transfer associated with a Tactical 
Decision-making game, using Close Combat: First to Fight™ (F2F) as a case study (see Figure 
3).  The null hypothesis to be tested is that traditional field training is equivalent to virtual 
training combined with field training.  Rigorous experimentation measures the subjects’ 
improvement in cognition when confronted with decision-making tasks. This experimentation 
will compare, assess, and report on training value achieved through traditional field training 
versus the benefits of virtual training combined with field training. 
 
Figure 3: Close Combat: First to Fight™ 
Approach 
The approach to this research is to examine a single game as a case study using the Yin 
(1984) Case Study Research methodology. The PC game (TDS) to be evaluated for training 
effectiveness is F2F. F2F is a tactical first-person shooter game developed by Destineer Studios 
and released to the commercial market in March 2005. 
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The game is focused (in the single-player mode) on a gamer who acts as a Marine fire 
team leader who leads a four-man fire team in close-quarters urban combat in the streets and 
buildings of Beirut. The typical scenario encompasses two to three blocks with limited access to 
buildings. Those buildings that are accessible have highly detailed interiors with cultural features 
such as pictures on the walls, carpets, and furniture. The doors can be opened and closed and 
windows can be fired through; however, most of the static items can not be manipulated.  
Game scenarios will be selected that replicate, as closely as possible, the CQB Tactical 
Performance Evaluation in the live fire “shoot house” facility at Chesapeake, Virginia. All 
experimental group participants will be afforded an opportunity to learn the basics of playing the 
game prior to the experimentation so as to not lose training time to learning “buttonology” and so 
that they are thinking about their actions within the game rather than which keys to push to 
perform the desired actions. 
An evaluation consisting of strictly controlled experimentation will be conducted in 
cooperation with the Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) Training Company. Data collection 
will involve Marines attending the CQB Course. The class is composed of enlisted Marines who 
have completed Basic Training (“Boot Camp”) and entry level infantry training at the Infantry 
Training Branch of the School of Infantry. Further, according to the Letter of Instruction (LOI) 
published by the MCSF Training Company, Marines must meet the following requirements to 
attend the course: 
(a) Must score a 1st class PFT [Physical Fitness Test] within 90 days of reporting. 
(b) Must be a Lance Corporal or above. A PFC [Private First Class] can only 
attend if they have six months time on station. 
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(c) All Marines during spin-ups must qualify with a minimum score of 300 on the 
CQB pistol qualification course. 
(d) Eye sight correctable to 20/20 in both eyes. Students must have glasses, 
contacts and gas mask inserts/goggles for the MCU-P2 gas mask. 
(e) No color blindness. 
(f) Any Marine who has failed a CQB course in the past because of safety 
violations must have a minimum of six months before he can attend again. 
(g) Not a prior heat or cold casualty within six months of reporting. 
(h) On full duty status. 
(i) Hearing in both ears. 
(j) During the conduct of the course, there will be no commitments or concerns 
that will require a student to be absent from training. Any student missing any 
2 training days during marksmanship or any 1 training day during tactics will 
be subject to automatic termination. 
(k) Must be mature, professional and willing to accept constructive criticism. 
(l) Must possess the ability to think/react quickly and correctly under stress. 
(m) Marines must have a minimum of one-year time remaining on station upon 
completion of the course. 
(n) Students must have all required gear IAW [In Accordance With] the course 
equipment list and their screening checklist. 
 The LOI also explains, “The program of instruction for the Close Quarters Battle course 
will include a wide range of intensely evaluated training evolutions that will challenge the 
students on a daily basis. The students will receive instruction in advanced marksmanship, basic 
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Close Quarters Battle tactics, Advanced Close Quarters Battle tactics, and CQB assault options.” 
(CO, MCSFTC, 2005) Specific Individual Training Standards (ITS) are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Index of Individual Events by Functional Area (Excerpt) (MCSF Bn T&R Manual, 2005) 
MOS 8154, MCSF CQB TEAM MEMBER 
 
ITS DESCRIPTION 
8154-CQB-1028  Perform weapons handling procedures with the Service pistol 
8154-CQB-1029 Engage stationary targets with the Service pistol 
8154-CQB-1030 Engage limited exposure targets with the Service pistol 
8154-CQB-1031 Engage targets in low light and darkness with the Service pistol 
8154-CQB-1032 Engage multiple targets with the Service pistol 
8154-CQB-1033  Engage moving targets with the Service pistol 
8154-CQB-1034 Engage targets while on the move with the Service pistol 
8154-CQB-1035 Perform weapons handling procedures with the M-4 Carbine 
8154-CQB-1036 Maintain the M-4 Carbine 
8154-CQB-1037 Zero the M-4 Carbine 
8154-CQB-1038 Engage stationary targets with the M-4 Carbine 
8154-CQB-1039 Engage limited exposure targets with the M-4 Carbine 
8154-CQB-1040 Engage targets during low light and darkness with the M-4 Carbine 
8154-CQB-1041 Engage targets with the M-4 Carbine with the field protective mask 
8154-CQB-1042 Engage multiple targets 
8154-CQB-1043 Engage moving targets with the M-4 Carbine 
8154-CQB-1044 Engage targets while on the move with the M-4 Carbine 
8154-CQB-1045 Move to the objective 
8154-CQB-1046 Enter the objective 
8154-CQB-1047 Clear an enclosure 
8154-CQB-1048 Clear a stairwell 
8154-CQB-1049 Clear a hallway 
8154-CQB-1050 Clear an elevator shaft 
8154-CQB-1051 Clear a vehicle 
8154-CQB-1052 Negotiate an improvised explosive device 
8154-CQB-1053 Control an occupant 
8154-CQB-1054 Evacuate an objective 
8154-CQB-1055 Employ a flash bang diversionary device 
8154-CQB-1056 Perform marshalling area procedures 
8154-CQB-1057 Conduct operations with a security element 
8154-CQB-1058 Conduct an assault rehearsal 
8154-CQB-1059 Conduct a turnover 
8154-CQB-1060 Coordinate designated marksman support 
8154-CQB-1061 Qualify on the CQB pistol qualification course 
8154-CQB-1062 Qualify on the CQB M-4 Carbine qualification course 
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The full CQB Course consists of twenty training days: nine days for marksmanship, six 
days for tactics, four days for operations and tactical evaluation, and one day for graduation (see 
Figure 4). The control group and the experimental group will complete the marksmanship and 
tactics phases together. The experiment will be conducted during the operations and tactical 
evaluation (Ops/Eval) phase. 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12 T-13 T-14 T-15 T-16 T-17 T-18 T-19 T-20
Grad
Data Collection
Marksmanship Tactics Ops / Eval
  
Figure 4: CQB Course Timeline 
 
During the Ops/Eval phase, on the night before the written final examination and the live-fire 
Tactical Evaluation, the students are provided with approximately three hours of mentored study 
time and three hours of supervised “walk-throughs” of the shoot house. The experimental group 
will be given one additional station, the TDS, during this final study and practice period. The 
time spent on the TDS will be taken from the time that would have been devoted to study and 
practice. As a result, the training will be as in Table 5 (not necessarily in the listed sequence):  
Table 5 
Study, Practice, and TDS Times 
Control Group  Experimental Group 
   TDS 2 hrs. 
Examination Study 3 hrs.  Examination Study 2 hrs. 
Shoot House 3 hrs.  Shoot House 2 hrs. 
 
Marines attending the course will be randomly assigned to eight-man teams to rotate 
between Examination Study, the Shoot House, and, for the experimental group, the TDS. During 
this evaluation phase, complete and accurate data collection will be accomplished. 
     
39 
Additionally, the total amount of training time, whether in a group participating in F2F 
training or not, must be equal to eliminate the possibility that simply providing additional 
training time might account for any differences in performance rather than the use of the 
computer game. It should be noted that a significant amount of “training time” is currently 
wasted by sitting around waiting for a turn in the shoot house. 
Design of the Experiment 
The initial intent was to establish a Solomon Four-Group Design at the experimental site. 
This particular design includes two control groups and two experimental groups, with one 
control group and one experimental group being pre-tested and all four groups being post-tested. 
The desire was to ensure that a pre-test would not impact the validity of the combined virtual 
training and field training. However, because the live training venue for this experiment involves 
live weapons firing in the shoot house, it is imperative for safety reasons that all groups be pre-
tested. Therefore, there will be one control group consisting of sixteen Marines with one 
observation per Marine and one experimental group consisting of sixteen Marines with one 
observation per Marine. I will use the Mann-Whitney Test, a non-parametric test used to 
compare two independent groups of sampled data. This test uses the ranks of the data rather than 
their raw values to calculate the statistic. The hypotheses for the two independent groups are: 
H.0: The two samples come from identical populations; that traditional field training is 
equivalent to virtual training combined with field training 
Ha: The two samples come from different populations; that there is a difference between 
traditional field training alone and virtual training combined with field training 
 Participants will be asked to complete an informed consent document (see Appendix B) 
and will be pre-screened based on age, time of service, previous training, normal billet, and 
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experience with computer games (see Appendix C). The total scores of each individual will then 
be compared for an analysis of the training effectiveness. Based on Kirkpatrick’s Hierarchy: 
• Reactions (attitudes about training) 
• Learning (permanent cognitive change) 
• Behavior ((transfer) on-the-job) 
• Results (initial problem solution, e.g., safety, mission success, cost savings), 
this analysis will provide a reliable prediction of the training transfer resulting from the PC-based 
wargames used in the training. 
Assessment 
“Interpreting the mass quantities of performance data … that are captured in some team 
settings, in some meaningful way is a daunting task at best. What knowledge requirements and 
behavioural skills lie behind those measures? It is vitally important that solid links are 
established between knowledge requirements, training objectives and performance indicators.” 
(Paris, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000) 
Similar to the need for consistent mentors, the Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) who oversee 
the CQB/MOUT Exercise must be the same throughout each evaluation occasion to ensure 
consistency of the results of the exercise evaluation. The O/Cs will not be informed whether each 
fire team under evaluation is part of the control group or the experimental group to ensure that no 
bias is introduced into the evaluation. This evaluation is, by its very nature, subjective so it is 
imperative to have consistency.  
Applying EBAT to the Development of a PC Game-Based Training Application 
  I used the EBAT cycle as provided by Salas, et al. (1999) as the basis for developing my 
training transfer evaluation. 
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1.  Skill Inventory/Performance Data 
 The task analysis, cognitive task analysis, and team task analysis are based upon the 
Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System for those tasks applicable to MOUT. 
2.  Learning Objectives/Competencies  
 The Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes will be based upon the Marine Corps ITSs for 
Infantry for those tasks applicable to CQB. 
3.  Scenario Scripts/Trigger Events 
 Based on steps one and two, I developed scenarios to be executed in the game. The 
specifics regarding the scenario and trigger events are maintained in a master scenario event list. 
4.  Performance Measures/Standards 
 Performance measures and standards are based upon the MCSF Training Company 
Program of Instruction and are delineated in the CQB Tactical Performance Evaluation. 
5.  Performance Diagnosis 
 Performance will be diagnosed based upon the participants’ actions in response to the 
scenario and events as compared to the performance measures and standards. 
6.  Feedback and Debrief 
 Constructive and specific feedback will be provided to all team members immediately 
upon completion of each scenario. 
7.  Incorporate into Future Training and Archive Data in a Meaningful Manner 
Lessons Learned during the training and experimentation will be recorded and 
incorporated into future experiments and training exercises. 
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Table 6 indicates the tasks and point values of each task to be evaluated. The written 
post-test is objective but can not reflect the command, control, communications, coordination, 
cooperation, and cognition that the game strives to train. 
Table 6 
CQB Tactical Performance Evaluation 
TASK POINTS 
ENTRY POINT /  BREACH POINT  
Proper team stack 1 
Passed ready signal / Initiates Countdown 1 
INITIAL ENTRY (Closed Door /  Student will enter as #3 Man  
Conducts Proper 5 Step Entry 5 
Proper Three-Man Entry 1 
ROOM 1 (Open Door)  
Proper Hallway Assessment / Coordination 2 
Conducts Proper 5 Step Entry 5 
Proper Two-man Entry 1 
Shot Delivery (Hammer Pair) 1 
Shot Placement (PSP -2 per round, two rounds total / Flyer -4) 4 
Conducts Door Check 1 
Conducts Dead Check 2 
Conducts Proper Marking Procedures 1 
Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT 3 
ROOM 2 (Open Door)  
Proper Hallway Assessment / Coordination 2 
Conducts Proper 5 Step Entry 5 
Proper Three-Man Entry 1 
Shot Delivery (Hammer Pair) 1 
Shot Placement (PSP -2 per round, 2 rounds total / Flyer -4) 4 
Conducts Dead Check 2 
Conducts Proper Marking Procedures 1 
Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT 3 
ROOM 3 (Closed Door)  
Proper Hallway Assessment / Coordination 2 
Conducts Proper Door Procedure 1 
Conducts Proper 5 Step Entry 5 
Proper Two-Man Entry 5 
Shot Delivery (Failure Drill) 1 
Applies Appropriate Immediate Action 2 
Shot Placement (PSP -2 per round, 4 rounds total / Flyer -8) 8 
Clears Immediate Danger Area (Furniture) 2 
Conducts Dead Check 2 
Conducts Proper Reload 2 
Conducts Proper Marking Procedures 1 
Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT 3 
ROOM 4 (Closed Door / Enters Room as 2nd Support Shooter)  
Proper Hallway Assessment / Coordination 2 
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Bumps Shooter Off Door /  Conducts Door Check 1 
Clears Stairwell Up 2 
Sounds Off “LAST ROOM” 1 
Conducts Proper Marking Procedures 1 
Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT 3 
POST ASSAULT  
Reports Objective Secure 1.5 
Establishes Strongpoints 1.5 
Submits a Proper Situation Report 2 
Links Up with Guard Force 2 
Conduct Walk Through / Change Over 1.5 
Request to Evacuate Assault Force 1.5 
Link Up with DM (Mark / Confirmation) 1.5 
Evacuate Assault Force from Objective 1.5 
SAFETY VIOLATIONS  
Live Fire N.D. -25 
Live Fire Muzzling -25 
Finger on Trigger -10 
Door Check at the Index -10 
Weapon on Fire -5 
Failure to Decock -5 
Failure to Abide by the Six Foot Rule -5 
RAW SCORE  
SAFETY VIOLATIONS  
FINAL SCORE (Passing 80/100)  
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
The Set-Up 
 I traveled to Chesapeake, Virginia on 3 November 2005 to meet with the Marine Corps 
Security Forces Training Company’s CQB Course Officer in Charge, Captain Peter Young, 
USMC and the CQB instructors. I showed them a Marine Corps film, “Tactical Decision-
making,” and demonstrated the F2F TDS, using two laptop computers from a DVTE training 
suite, to familiarize them with the software. I also presented the experiment plan for their 
awareness. 
 On 4 November, I again met with Captain Young to discuss the details of the experiment 
plan and to teach him how to review the various scenarios available in First to Fight as well as 
how to use the editor to modify the scenarios. The two laptop computers were left with Captain 
Young for his and his staff’s use in familiarizing themselves more completely with the TDS, as 
well as to review the various “levels” or terrains available. 
 I returned to Chesapeake on 13 November, bringing with me another six DVTE laptop 
computers to establish a simulation room for the experiment. Unfortunately, the airline misrouted 
the computers, leaving me empty-handed at the airport! They showed up about eight hours later, 
too late for setting up as planned. Additionally, four desktop computers were to have been 
shipped from the developer of the software to augment the DVTE computers. The plan was to 
have eight DVTE laptop computers for the experimental group, two computers for the instructors 
acting as the opposing forces (OpFor), one computer as an observer station, and one spare. The 
desktops were never shipped! 
 Monday, 14 November was to be a familiarization day for the experimental group to 
become acquainted with the software. The group was to be divided into two sessions of eight 
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participants per session for a total of 16 participants in the overall experimental group. Because 
of unforeseen schedule changes at the school, the entire group showed up at one session. Further, 
one of the laptop computers refused to cooperate, so we were forced to conduct the 
familiarization for sixteen Marines on seven computers. Fortunately, more than half of them 
were already familiar with F2F, so most of the roughly 45 minutes of computer time was 
allocated to the Marines who had not played the commercial game previously. The 
familiarization consisted of playing the standard game without concern for actual tactics simply 
to provide the Marines with an opportunity to learn the basic commands and controls of the 
game. Additionally, all sixteen Marines were given an opportunity during the 45 minutes 
familiarization to use the new “Marine Combat Pad,” (see Figure 5) an input device designed to 
simplify entering commands with one hand while using the other for the mouse inputs. 
 
Figure 5: CQB Marine in Action; Marine Combat Pad 
 On Tuesday, 15 November, I was able to rent one desktop computer and on Wednesday, 
16 November, I was able to rent two more desktop computers and set them up in the simulation 
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room prior to the evening experiment. The layout was modified slightly, with the eight 
experimental subjects and the two instructor OpFor using the ten computers as shown in Figure 6 
but with no observer station and no spare available. 
1 2 3 4





Figure 6: Computer Layout 
The experiment 
 In the late afternoon of Wednesday, 16 November, the two instructors who were to play 
the roles of the OpFor came in to rehearse their actions that they would take during the training. 
In the early evening, the first half of the experimental group showed up while the other half of 
the experimental group and the control group alternated between supervised studying for the 
written final exam and conducting mentored walk-throughs of the final Tactical Evaluation. 
They had just completed roughly 36 hours of field exercises, so were somewhat tired and things 
were a bit slow to get going. 
 The subjects were provided with the Informed Consent form (Appendix B) and I 
explained it to them; none declined to participate. They then completed the Demographics 
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Questionnaire (Appendix C), the Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (Appendix D), and the 
Baseline (Pre) Exposure Symptom Checklist (Appendix E). 
 Experimental Group Treatment: The experimental groups then proceeded through a series 
of missions following the pattern of: 
Mission brief and planning – the instructors briefed the mission and prepared the scenario and 
the Marines would be given a short time for planning (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: CQB Instructor Briefing the Mission While another Instructor Prepares the Scenario 
Execution – the Marines executed their plan in the simulation as an eight-man team, using the 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) that they had been taught in the school (see Figure 
8). The OPFOR consisted of two terrorist avatars deployed inside buildings and controlled by 
two instructors.   
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Figure 8: CQB Marines during Execution 
After Action Review – the instructors (see Figure 9) and the Marines discussed jointly how the 
plan fared; how they conducted the TTPs, including command and control (team leader), 
communications, coordination, and cooperation as team members, and cognition as individuals; 
and how they could improve in the next mission. 
 
Figure 9: CQB Officer in Charge Observing Marines during Execution to Prepare for the Debrief 
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 Post exercise Survey: After approximately an hour-and-a-half of instructor-created 
missions in First to Fight, the subjects completed a Post 00 Minutes Exposure Symptom 
Checklist (Appendix F) and a Post-Experiment Questionnaire (Appendix G). 
 At this point the two halves of the experimental group swapped places and the second 
group ran through the experiment precisely as the first group had done. 
The Demographics 
 A complete summary of the survey of participant demographics is found at Appendix H.  
Highlights from the demographic survey are as follows: The “average” Marine experimental 
subject was a 19 ½ year old Lance Corporal with fourteen months in the Marine Corps who plays 
4 ½ hours of video games per week. All subjects stated that they had played a First Person 
Shooter and nearly all had played Role Playing Games and Real Time Strategy games. About a 
third admitted to playing one or more of these types of videogames regularly. As mentioned 
earlier, just over half had played Close Combat: First to Fight previously. 
 None of the Marines had consumed an alcoholic beverage in the previous 24 hours (they 
were conducting field training) and none had taken any medication stronger than aspirin. 
However, because of the field exercises, they averaged only 2 ½ hours of sleep in the previous 
36 hours. Interestingly, a third stated that they had had enough sleep. 
The Tactical Evaluation 
 On Thursday, 17 November, each student was evaluated on his performance in 
conducting CQB in the live fire shoot house. Each student was placed into a four-man CQB team 
(one student with three instructors), the same three instructors running each of the 32 Marines 
through the Tactical Evaluation. This ensured that any variability in performance was directly 
attributable to the student and not to the other team members as could be the case in a team 
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evaluation. Additionally, an instructor O/C followed behind the team and another instructor 
observed remotely via video cameras (see Figure 10). Students who completed their evaluation 
were kept segregated form the students who were waiting their turns. Each student was 
confronted with the same mission, rooms to clear, and targets to engage. 
 
Figure 10: CQB Instructors Observing Marines Remotely during the Tactical Evaluation 
 The Tactical Evaluation score sheet had been modified by the schoolhouse prior to this 
evolution. The revised score sheet is reproduced in Table 7 below, with those areas that had 
corresponding training objectives in the F2F experiment highlighted: 
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Table 7 
Revised CQB Tactical Performance Evaluation 




TASK POINTS SCORE 
ROOM 1 (Open Door)   
Proper Hallway Assessment / Coordination -2  
Conducts Proper 5 Step Entry -5  
Immediate Action -2  
Shot Delivery -2  
Shot Placement (Flyer -4) -4  
Conducts Door Check -1  
Conducts Dead Check -2  
Conducts Proper Marking -1  
Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT -3  
Reload -2  
Stairwell Up / Down -2  
POST ASSAULT   
Reports Objective Secure -3  
Establishes Strongpoints -1  
Submits A Proper Situation Report -2  
Links Up With Guard Force -1  
Conduct Walk Through / Change Over -1  
Request to Evacuate Assault Force -1  
Link Up With DM (Mark / Confirmation) -1  
Security Shooter -3  
Evacuate Assault Force From Objective -1  
SAFETY VIOLATIONS   
Live Fire N.D. F  
Live Fire Muzzling F  
Finger on Trigger -15  
Door Check at the Index -10  
Weapon on Fire -5  
Failure to Decock -10  
Failure to Abide By The Six Foot Rule -10  
RAW SCORE 100 
SAFETY / TACTICAL VIOLATIONS  
FINAL SCORE (Passing 80 / 100)  
 
 Marines who failed the Tactical Evaluation were given a second opportunity to pass; 
however, their original scores were used for this experiment. Eight Marines (two in the 
Experimental Group and six in the Control Group) failed the Tactical Evaluation as a result of 
safety violations the first time through and received scores of 0. Only one of the eight Marines 
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passed on his second try; the others were dropped from the class (yes, the day before graduation 
from a four-week course!).  
The Numbers 
 Results will be approached from four different perspectives: Total scores for all 32 
Marines, total scores for the 24 Marines without safety failures, tactical scores (without safety 
violation deductions) for the 24 Marines, and TDS-related scores (those scoring categories that 
had related training objectives during the TDS exercise) for the 24 Marines. Each case will be 
analyzed with both the Mann-Whitney and the Chi Square non-parametric tests. Recall the basic 
hypotheses: 
H.0: The two samples come from identical populations; that traditional field training is 
equivalent to virtual training combined with field training 
Ha: The two samples come from different populations; that there is a difference between 
traditional field training alone and virtual training combined with field training 
Total Scores for All Thirty-Two Marines 
 The first examination includes all thirty-two Marines in the test population, including the 
eight who failed out of the course. The raw scores can vary between 0 and 100. The individual 
activity scores can be seen in Appendix I. Table 8 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney Test 
for na = 16; nb = 16: 
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Table 8 
Mann-Whitney Test for All 32 Marines 
 Ranks  Scores  
























































































Sum: 280.5 247.5 Avg: 74.06 53.69 
 
 The sum of the ranks for the Experimental Group, TA = 280.5. TA[max] =  392. The 
difference between TA and TA[max] (UA) is 111.5. Based on the table of critical values of U for na 
= 16; nb = 16, the lower limit for a .05 level of significance for a directional test is 83. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the value of TA would have to be less than 83. (Since, in this case, we 
want the ranks of the Experimental Group to be larger, the resulting value of U would have to be 
smaller.) Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for this examination even though the 
average scores appear to be quite different (74.06 vs. 53.69). 
 To confirm this result, the Chi Square Test follows in Table 9 (excerpted): 
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Table 9 
Chi Square Test for All 32 Marines 
Total Score: 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73 0 
Experimental 
Group 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Exper Group 
Expected .5 0 0 .5 1 0 1.5 1 1.5 .5 0 1.5 .5 1 .5 0 0 .5 1 0 0 0 .5 4 
Exper Group 
Chi Square .5 0 0 .5 1 0 .2 1 .2 .5 0 .2 .5 0 .5 0 0 .5 1 0 0 0 .5 1 
Control Group 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 
Control Group 
Expected .5 0 0 .5 1 0 1.5 1 1.5 .5 0 1.5 .5 1 .5 0 0 .5 1 0 0 0 .5 4 
Control Group 
Chi Square .5 0 0 .5 1 0 .2 1 .2 .5 0 .2 .5 0 .5 0 0 .5 1 0 0 0 .5 1 
Total 1 0 0 1 2 0 3 2 3 1 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 8 
 
 Total Chi Square = 16; Degrees of Freedom = 100; Critical Value (.05) = 124.342. Again, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
 One additional test was run for this population, Fisher’s Exact Probability Test, to 
determine if the difference between the number of Marines in the experimental group who 
passed the Tactical Evaluation was significantly different from the number of Marines in the 
control group who passed it. The table of frequency values follows in Table 10: 
Table 10 
Fisher’s Exact Probability Test for All 32 Marines 
Test 
Status TDS Control Combined 
Pass 14 10 24 
Fail 2 6 8 
Totals 16 16 32 
 
 The result of this test is 0.11, so the number of Marines in the experimental group that 
passed the Tactical Evaluation versus the number of Marines in the control group that passed is 
not statistically significant. 
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Total Scores for the Twenty-Four Marines without Safety Failures 
 The next examination includes only the twenty-four Marines of the test population who 
did not fail the course because of safety infractions. The raw scores can still vary between 0 and 
100. The individual activity scores can be seen in Appendix I. Table 11 shows the results of the 
Mann-Whitney test for na = 14; nb = 10: 
Table 11 
Mann-Whitney Test for 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
 Ranks Scores  






































































Sum: 159.5 140.5 Avg: 84.64 85.9 
 
 The sum of the ranks for the Experimental Group, TA = 159.5. TA[max] =  245. The 
difference between TA and TA[max] (UA) is 85.5. Based on the table of critical values of U for na = 
14; nb = 10, the lower limit for a .05 level of significance for a directional test is 41. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the value of TA would have to be less than 41. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for this examination. 
 To confirm this result, the Chi Square Test follows in Table 12 (excerpted): 
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Table 12 
Chi Square Test for 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
Total Score: 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73
Experimental 
Group 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
Experimental 
Group 
Expected 0.6 0 0 0.6 1.2 0 1.8 1.2 1.8 0.6 0 1.8 0.6 1.2 0.6 0 0 0.6 1.2 0 0 0 0.6
Experimental 
Group Chi 
Square 0.3 0 0 0.6 1.2 0 0.3 0.6 0 0.3 0 0 0.3 0 0.6 0 0 0.3 0.6 0 0 0 0.6
Control 
Group 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Control 
Group 
Expected 0.4 0 0 0.4 0.8 0 1.3 0.8 1.3 0.4 0 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 0 0 0.4 0.8 0 0 0 0.4
Control 
Group Chi 
Square 0.4 0 0 0.8 1.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.4 0 0.1 0.4 0 0.8 0 0 0.4 0.8 0 0 0 0.8
Total 1 0 0 1 2 0 3 2 3 1 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1
 
 Total Chi Square = 13.71; Degrees of Freedom = 100; Critical Value (.05) = 124.342. 
Again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Tactical Scores for the Twenty-Four Marines without Safety Failures 
 This examination again includes only the twenty-four Marines of the test population who 
did not fail the course because of safety infractions. However, rather than looking at the total 
score, which includes safety violations, we look only at the tactical score. Most live fire safety 
rules (such as negligent discharge, finger on the trigger when not intending to shoot, weapon on 
fire rather than safe when not intending to shoot, and failure to de-cock the service pistol) cannot 
be replicated in the TDS so it is not unreasonable to exclude them from the analysis. The raw 
scores can only vary between 60 and 100. The individual activity scores can be seen in Appendix 
I. Table 13 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney test for na = 14; nb = 10: 
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Table 13 
Mann-Whitney Test for Tactical Scores of 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
 Ranks Scores  






































































Sum: 182.5 117.5 Avg: 88.93 87.90 
 
 The sum of the ranks for the Experimental Group, TA = 182.5. TA[max] =  245. The 
difference between TA and TA[max] (UA) is 62.5. Based on the table of critical values of U for na = 
14; nb = 10, the lower limit for a .05 level of significance for a directional test is 41. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the value of TA would have to be less than 41. Therefore, while closer 
than the previous examination, the null hypothesis still cannot be rejected for this examination. 
 To confirm this result, the Chi Square Test (excerpted) is shown in Table 14: 
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Table 14 
Chi Square Test for Tactical Scores of 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
Total Score: 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 
Experimental 
Group 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 3 3 0 0 1 0 1
Experimental 
Group Expected 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.2 2.3 0 1.8 1.8 2.3 0 0 1.2 0.6 1.2
Experimental 
Group Chi Square 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0.8 0 0.3 0.9 0.2 0 0 0 0.6 0
Control Group 0 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Control Group 
Expected 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.7 0 1.3 1.3 1.7 0 0 0.8 0.4 0.8
Control Group Chi 
Square 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 1.1 0 0.5 1.3 0.3 0 0 0 0.8 0
Total 1 1 1 2 4 0 3 3 4 0 0 2 1 2
 
 Total Chi Square = 8.91; Degrees of Freedom = 40; Critical Value (.05) = 51.805. Again, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
 TDS-Related Scores for the Twenty-Four Marines without Safety Failures 
 This final examination again includes only the twenty-four Marines of the test population 
who did not fail the course because of safety infractions. This time, we take it one step further. 
Rather than looking at the total tactical score, we look only at the scoring aspects determined 
before-hand (as highlighted on the Tactical Evaluation score sheet) to be truly subject to training 
by the TDS. Many of the tactical tasks (such as immediate action for a weapon malfunction, 
conducting a “dead check,” properly marking a room, and evacuating the assault force from the 
objective [as soon as all of the Opposing Force is eliminated, the simulation ends]) cannot be 
replicated in the TDS so it is not unreasonable to exclude them from the analysis. Hence, the raw 
scores can only vary between 82 and 100. The individual activity scores can be seen in Appendix 
I. Table 15 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney test for na = 14; nb = 10: 
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Table 15 
Mann-Whitney Test for TDS-Related Scores of 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
 Ranks Scores  






































































Sum: 187.5 112.5 Avg: 93.5 93.0 
 
 The sum of the ranks for the Experimental Group, TA = 187.5. TA[max] =  245. The 
difference between TA and TA[max] (UA) is 57.5. Based on the table of critical values of U for na = 
14; nb = 10, the lower limit for a .05 level of significance for a directional test is 41. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the value of TA would have to be less than 41. Therefore, while still 
closer than the previous examination, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for this examination. 
 To confirm this result, the Chi Square Test (excerpted) is shown in Table 16: 
Table 16 
Chi Square Test for TDS-Related Scores of 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
Total Score: 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89
Experimental Group 1 1 3 3 1 3 1 0 1
Experimental Group Expected 0.6 0.6 2.3 3.5 2.3 2.9 0.6 0.6 0.6
Experimental Group Chi Square 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 0 0.3 0.6 0.3
Control Group 0 0 1 3 3 2 0 1 0
Control Group Expected 0.4 0.4 1.7 2.5 1.7 2.1 0.4 0.4 0.4
Control Group Chi Square 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.1 0 0.4 0.8 0.4
Total 1 1 4 6 4 5 1 1 1
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 Total Chi Square = 6.72; Degrees of Freedom = 18; Critical Value (.05) = 28.869. Yet 
again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
The Feedback 
 At the conclusion of each (experimental) training session, the Marines of the 
experimental group were asked to complete the Post-Experiment Questionnaire. The specific 
question asked was, “How useful do you think the Tactical Decision-making Simulation was in 
providing an opportunity for students to improve on these skills to execute the mission?” Table 
17 and Figure 11 show the aggregated results. 
Table 17 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire Results 
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Avg: 3.5 3.75 3.88 3.88 3.69 3.06 3.13 
Scale: 1 = Not at all useful; 2 = Not very useful; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Useful; 5 = Very Useful 
 

















































































Figure 11: Post Exercise Questionnaire Graph 
 In the following section, we will look at the Marines’ responses to each question. 
1. Planning. The average of the responses to the question, “How useful do you think the Tactical 
Decision-making Simulation was in providing an opportunity for students to improve on 
planning to execute the mission?” was 3.5. See Figure 12 for a comparison of responses to the 
expected responses in a normal distribution. Table 18 displays the results of the t-Test. 



















Figure 12: Responses to Planning vs. Normal Distribution 
Table 18 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of Planning vs. Normal Distribution 
  Planning Normal Dist 
Mean 3.5 3 
Variance 0.666666667 1.06666667 
Observations 16 16 
Pearson Correlation 0.079056942  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 15  
t Stat 1.58113883  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.067349412  
t Critical one-tail 1.753051038  
 
 The t-value is not large enough for the responses to Planning to be statistically significant 
compared to a normal distribution. 
2. Situational Awareness. The average of the responses to the question, “How useful do you 
think the Tactical Decision-making Simulation was in providing an opportunity for students to 
improve on situational awareness to execute the mission?” was 3.75. See Figure 13 for a 
comparison of responses to the expected responses in a normal distribution. Table 19 displays 
the results of the t-Test. 






















Figure 13: Responses to Situational Awareness vs. Normal Distribution 
Table 19 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of Situational Awareness vs. Normal Distribution 
  
Situational 
Awareness Normal Dist 
Mean 3.75 3 
Variance 0.733333333 1.06666667 
Observations 16 16 
Pearson Correlation 0  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 15  
t Stat 2.236067977  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.020484478  
t Critical one-tail 1.753051038  
 
 The t-value is large enough for the responses to Situational Awareness to be statistically 
significant compared to a normal distribution. 
3. Intra-Team Communications. The average of the responses to the question, “How useful do 
you think the Tactical Decision-making Simulation was in providing an opportunity for students 
to improve on intra-team communications to execute the mission?” was 3.88. See Figure 14 for a 
comparison of responses to the expected responses in a normal distribution. Table 20 displays 
the results of the t-Test. 





















Figure 14: Responses to Intra-Team Communications vs. Normal Distribution 
Table 20 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of Intra-Team Communications vs. Normal Distribution 
  
Intra-Team 
Comms Normal Dist 
Mean 3.875 3 
Variance 1.05 1.06666667 
Observations 16 16 
Pearson Correlation -0.31497039  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 15  
t Stat 2.097903145  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.026632475  
t Critical one-tail 1.753051038  
 
 The t-value is large enough for the responses to Intra-Team Communications to be 
statistically significant compared to a normal distribution. 
4. Tactical Awareness. The average of the responses to the question, “How useful do you think 
the Tactical Decision-making Simulation was in providing an opportunity for students to 
improve on tactical awareness to execute the mission?” was 3.88. See Figure 15 for a 
comparison of responses to the expected responses in a normal distribution. Table 21 displays 
the results of the t-Test. 



















Figure 15: Responses to Tactical Awareness vs. Normal Distribution 
Table 21 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of Tactical Awareness vs. Normal Distribution 
  
Tactical 
Awareness Normal Dist 
Mean 3.875 3 
Variance 0.65 1.06666667 
Observations 16 16 
Pearson Correlation 0.240192231  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 15  
t Stat 3.050212692  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.004049976  
t Critical one-tail 1.753051038  
 
 The t-value is large enough for the responses to Tactical Awareness to be statistically 
significant compared to a normal distribution. 
5. Movement Techniques. The average of the responses to the question, “How useful do you 
think the Tactical Decision-making Simulation was in providing an opportunity for students to 
improve on movement techniques to execute the mission?” was 3.69. See Figure 16 for a 
comparison of responses to the expected responses in a normal distribution. Table 22 displays 
the results of the t-Test. 



















Figure 16: Responses to Movement Techniques vs. Normal Distribution 
Table 22 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of Movement Techniques vs. Normal Distribution 
  
Movement 
Techniques Normal Dist 
Mean 3.6875 3 
Variance 1.029166667 1.06666667 
Observations 16 16 
Pearson Correlation 0.063628476  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 15  
t Stat 1.963034178  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.034230477  
t Critical one-tail 1.753051038  
 
 The t-value is large enough for the responses to Movement Techniques to be statistically 
significant compared to a normal distribution. 
6. Weapons Employment. The average of the responses to the question, “How useful do you 
think the Tactical Decision-making Simulation was in providing an opportunity for students to 
improve on weapons employment to execute the mission?” was 3.06. See Figure 17 for a 
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comparison of responses to the expected responses in a normal distribution. Table 23 displays 


















Figure 17: Responses to Weapons Employment vs. Normal Distribution 
Table 23 






Mean 3.0625 3 
Variance 0.8625 1.06666667 
Observations 16 16 
Pearson Correlation 0.069504805  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 15  
t Stat 0.186555043  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.427254589  
t Critical one-tail 1.753051038  
 
 The t-value is not large enough for the responses to Weapons Employment to be 
statistically significant compared to a normal distribution. 
7. Rules of Engagement. The average of the responses to the question, “How useful do you think 
the Tactical Decision-making Simulation was in providing an opportunity for students to 
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improve on rules of engagement to execute the mission?” was 3.13. See Figure 18 for a 
comparison of responses to the expected responses in a normal distribution. Table 24 displays 





















Figure 18: Responses to Rules of Engagement vs. Normal Distribution 
Table 24 






Mean 3.125 3 
Variance 0.783333333 1.06666667 
Observations 16 16 
Pearson Correlation 0.291729983  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 15  
t Stat 0.43574467  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.334613749  
t Critical one-tail 1.753051038  
 
 The t-value is not large enough for the responses to Rules of Engagement to be 
statistically significant compared to a normal distribution. 
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 These tests tell us that the Marine students, who had already spent 3 ½ weeks in the CQB 
Course, felt that the TDS provided an opportunity for the students to improve their skills in 
Situational Awareness, Intra-Team Communications, Tactical Awareness, and Movement 
Techniques in a statistically significant manner. We can relate these directly back to the four 
TDS-related items from the Tactical Evaluation that are in the assault phase that was practiced in 
F2F: “Proper Hallway Assessment / Coordination” (Situational Awareness, Intra-Team 
Communications), “Conducts Proper 5 Step Entry” (Tactical Awareness, Movement 
Techniques), “Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT” (Situational Awareness, Tactical 
Awareness), and “Stairwell Up / Down” (Tactical Awareness, Movement Techniques).  
 With this revelation in mind, let us look at one more Mann-Whitney Test. This 
examination again includes only the twenty-four Marines of the test population who did not fail 
the course because of safety infractions. We look only at the scoring aspects corresponding to 
those areas judged by the Marines to be most valuable for improving their skills. In this case, the 
raw scores can only vary between 88 and 100. The individual activity scores can be seen in 
Appendix I. Table 25 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney test for na = 14; nb = 10: 
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Table 25 
Mann-Whitney Test for Assault Phase TDS-Related Scores of 24 Marines without Safety 
Failures 
 Ranks Scores  






































































Sum: 191.0 109.0 Avg: 95.14 94.6 
 
 The sum of the ranks for the Experimental Group, TA = 191.0. TA[max] =  245. The 
difference between TA and TA[max] (UA) is 54. Based on the table of critical values of U for na = 
14; nb = 10, the lower limit for a .05 level of significance for a directional test is 41. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the value of TA would have to be less than 41. Therefore, while even 
closer still than the previous examination, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for this 
examination. 
 To confirm this result, the Chi Square Test follows in Table 26 (excerpted): 
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Table 26 
Chi Square Test for Assault Phase TDS-Related Scores of 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
Total Score: 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 
Experimental Group 1 1 3 5 3 0 1 
Experimental Group Expected 0.6 0.6 3.5 4.1 3.5 1.2 0.6 
Experimental Group Chi Square 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.3 
Control Group 0 0 3 2 3 2 0 
Control Group Expected 0.4 0.4 2.5 2.9 2.5 0.8 0.4 
Control Group Chi Square 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.6 0.4 
Total 1 1 6 7 6 2 1 
 
 Total Chi Square = 5.78; Degrees of Freedom = 12; Critical Value (.05) = 21.026. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
 Finally, we will look at these four TDS-related items individually. First is “Proper 
Hallway Assessment / Coordination.” Unfortunately almost every Marine in both the control and 
experimental groups lost the maximum points on this so any evaluation would be pointless. In 
fact, only one Marine out of the entire class received any points for this item.  
 Moving to the next item, “Conducts Proper 5 Step Entry,” the experimental group scored 
a combined 80% compared to the control group’s 66%. This examination includes only the 
twenty-four Marines of the test population who did not fail the course because of safety 
infractions. We look only at the scoring aspects corresponding to the “Conducts Proper 5 Step 
Entry.” The individual activity scores can be seen in Appendix I. Table 27 shows the results of 
the Mann-Whitney test for na = 14; nb = 10: 
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Table 27 
Mann-Whitney Test for “Conducts Proper5-Step Entry” Scores of 24 Marines without Safety 
Failures 
 Ranks Scores  






































































Sum: 202 98 Avg: 4.0 3.3 
 
 The sum of the ranks for the Experimental Group, TA = 202.0. TA[max] =  245. The 
difference between TA and TA[max] (UA) is 43. Based on the table of critical values of U for na = 
14; nb = 10, the lower limit for a .05 level of significance for a directional test is 41. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the value of TA would have to be less than 41. Therefore, although it is 
extremely close, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for this examination. 
 To confirm this result, the Chi Square Test (excerpted) is shown in Table 28: 
Table 28 
Chi Square Test for “Conducts Proper5-Step Entry” Scores of 24 Marines without Safety 
Failures 
Total Score: 5 4 3 2
Experimental Group 6 2 6 0
Experimental Group Expected 3.5 3.5 6.4 1.4
Experimental Group Chi Square 1.8 0.6 0 1.4
Control Group 0 4 5 1
Control Group Expected 2.5 2.5 4.6 0.4
Control Group Chi Square 2.5 0.9 0 0.8
Total 6 6 11 1
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 Total Chi Square = 5.83; Degrees of Freedom = 5; Critical Value (.05) = 11.07. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
 Moving to the third item, “Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT,” the experimental group 
scored a combined 50% compared to the control group’s 56.7%. This examination includes only 
the twenty-four Marines of the test population who did not fail the course because of safety 
infractions. We look only at the scoring aspects corresponding to the “Maintains Tactical 
Advantage / IBT.” The individual activity scores can be seen in Appendix I. Table 29 shows the 
results of the Mann-Whitney test for na = 14; nb = 10: 
Table 29 
Mann-Whitney Test for “Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT” Scores of 24 Marines without 
Safety Failures 
 Ranks Scores  






































































Sum: 166.5 133.5 Avg: 1.5 1.7 
 
 The sum of the ranks for the Experimental Group, TA = 166.5. TA[max] =  245. The 
difference between TA and TA[max] (UA) is 78.5. Based on the table of critical values of U for na = 
14; nb = 10, the lower limit for a .05 level of significance for a directional test is 41. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the value of TA would have to be less than 41. Therefore, the null 
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hypothesis cannot be rejected for this examination. In actuality, the control group scored slightly 
better than the experimental group on this task. However, the upper limit for a .05 level of 
significance for a directional test is 99. For the opposite effect to have been true (that the control 
group scored significantly better than the experimental group), the value of TA would have to be 
greater than 99. Therefore, the null hypothesis still cannot be rejected. 
 To confirm this result, the Chi Square Test (excerpted) is shown in Table 30: 
Table 30 
Chi Square Test for “Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT” Scores of 24 Marines without Safety 
Failures 
Total Score: 5 4 3 2
Experimental Group 6 2 6 0
Experimental Group Expected 3.5 3.5 6.4 1.4
Experimental Group Chi Square 1.8 0.6 0 1.4
Control Group 0 4 5 1
Control Group Expected 2.5 2.5 4.6 0.4
Control Group Chi Square 2.5 0.9 0 0.8
Total 6 6 11 1
 
 Total Chi Square = 0.75; Degrees of Freedom = 3; Critical Value (.05) = 7.815. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
 Finally, in the fourth item, “Stairwell,” the experimental group scored a combined 
82.14% compared to the control group’s 70.0%. This examination includes only the twenty-four 
Marines of the test population who did not fail the course because of safety infractions. We look 
only at the scoring aspects corresponding to the “Stairwell.” The individual activity scores can be 
seen in Appendix I. Table 31 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney test for na = 14; nb = 10: 
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Table 31 
Mann-Whitney Test for “Stairwell” Scores of 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
 Ranks Scores  






































































Sum: 185 115 Avg: 1.64 1.4 
 
 The sum of the ranks for the Experimental Group, TA = 185. TA[max] =  245. The 
difference between TA and TA[max] (UA) is 60. Based on the table of critical values of U for na = 
14; nb = 10, the lower limit for a .05 level of significance for a directional test is 41. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the value of TA would have to be less than 41. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for this examination. 
 To confirm this result, the Chi Square Test (excerpted) is shown in Table 32: 
Table 32 
Chi Square Test for “Stairwell” Scores of 24 Marines without Safety Failures 
Total Score: 2 1 0 
Experimental Group 10 3 1 
Experimental Group Expected 9.3 2.9 4.2 
Experimental Group Chi Square 0 0 2.4 
Control Group 6 2 2 
Control Group Expected 6.7 2.1 1.3 
Control Group Chi Square 0.1 0 0.5 
Total 16 5 3 
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  Total Chi Square = 0.114; Degrees of Freedom = 2; Critical Value (.05) = 5.99. 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Turning back to the questionnaires, while there is not enough evidence to prove a 
correlation, it is interesting to note that when the Post-Experiment Questionnaires from the two 
Marines from the experimental group who had been dropped from the class are eliminated from 
the calculations (see Table 33), the average scores in all seven categories increase! 
Table 33 

















Avg: 3.64 3.86 3.93 4.00 3.79 3.07 3.21 
 
 In fact, this increase causes the t-value to become large enough for the responses to 
Planning to be statistically significant compared to a normal distribution (see Table 34). 
Table 34 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means of Planning vs. Normal Distribution without Tactical 
Evaluation Failures 
  Planning Normal Dist 
Mean 3.64285714 3 
Variance 0.55494505 0.96153846 
Observations 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0.47387177  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 13  
t Stat 2.64952826  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.01001486  
t Critical one-tail 1.7709317  
 
 Also interesting is the correlation between the Tactical Evaluation tactical scores of the 
top five Experimental Group Marines (all scoring in the 90s) and their Questionnaire scores as 
compared to the rest of the experimental group (see Table 35). 
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Table 35 
Comparison between Tactical Evaluation scores and Post-Exercise Questionnaire 











93 28.6  86.667 23.777 
 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, at least on the surface, the Marines who stated on the demographics 
questionnaire that they play First Person Shooter games “regularly” did not estimate the TDS to 
be quite as useful as the top five Tactical Evaluation scorers, nor did they score as highly on the 
Tactical Evaluation (see Table 36). However, based on my experience with TDSs, gamers tend 
to “game the game” whereas the TDSs are designed for the Marines to practice their real-world 
TTPs, so these results are not surprising. 
Table 36 













88.6 28  93 28.6 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Summary 
 The purpose of this research was to evaluate the training transfer associated with a 
Tactical Decision-making game, using Close Combat: First to Fight as a case study.  The null 
hypothesis that was tested was that traditional field training is equivalent to virtual training 
combined with field training. Measurements of the subjects’ performance in live training were 
recorded.  Additionally, self assessment questionnaires were administered. This experimentation 
compared, assessed, and reported on training value achieved through traditional field training 
versus the benefits of virtual training combined with field training. In order to explore this 
question a field experiment was conducted using the Close Combat: First to Fight software to 
train sixteen Marines in the tactical tasks associated with Close Quarters Battle. The extent of the 
training using the simulation involved one familiarization session for approximately 45 minutes 
and two training sessions with eight Marines in each two-hour session.   
Conclusions 
 The experimental group numerically outscored and appeared to outperform the control 
group on the live fire Tactical Evaluation. The differences in measured performance during the 
live exercise between the control group and experimental group approached statistical 
significance. 
Self-assessment evaluations did result in statistically significant results. Marines in the 
experimental group felt that the TDS provided an opportunity for the students to improve their 
skills in Situational Awareness, Intra-Team Communications, Tactical Awareness, and 
Movement Techniques in a statistically significant manner. This is consistent with prior self 
assessment evaluations on games. 
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 These positive areas of self-assessments arising from practice in F2F can be directly 
related back to a subset of four performance measures in the assault phase of the Tactical 
Evaluation. They are “Proper Hallway Assessment / Coordination” (Situational Awareness, 
Intra-Team Communications), “Conducts Proper 5 Step Entry” (Tactical Awareness, Movement 
Techniques), “Maintains Tactical Advantage / IBT” (Situational Awareness, Tactical 
Awareness), and “Stairwell Up / Down” (Tactical Awareness, Movement Techniques).  
Statistical analysis of these four measures in aggregation and individually revealed that the 
experimental group did not perform statistically different from the control group.   
Some possible explanations for the lack of statistical differences in terms of the 
performance portion of this research, in order of importance, include: 
• Insufficient training time. The last-minute reduction in training time allotted to the TDS 
resulted in only a two-hour intervention in a four-week, 160+ hour course of instruction. 
This relatively minor training period, being such a small percentage of the overall course, 
had little opportunity to make a statistical impact. 
• Insufficient confidence in the method of instruction on the part of the instructors. Without 
evidence of the validity of the type of training that this experiment was designed to 
demonstrate, instructors were hesitant to devote themselves in the full measure required 
to conduct proper training (scenario preparation, briefing, mentoring, and debriefing). 
• Insufficient ability of the simulation to represent real world physical interactions. In a 
CQB environment, where darkness and noise may impede visual and auditory 
communication, physical interaction becomes vital. Among these are “stacking,” the “leg 
bump,” “dead checks,” and the Hostages, Unidentified, Terrorists, and Shooters (HUTS) 
report. 
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o Stacking: Before entering a room, Marines line up outside the door (see Figure 19). 
Each Marine in the stack has a specific task, based on his position in the stack, once 
inside the room. Because of an issue with collision detection in the game, the Marines 
had a difficult time stacking before entering rooms that were to be cleared. This issue 
is the result of the method of application of “bounding boxes” in the software. 
 
Figure 19: CQB Marines in the Stack 
o Leg bump: When Marines encounter a situation (such as clearing a room) that 
requires multiple Marines to act together, the number two man in the stack uses his 
knee to bump the lead Marine in his hamstring to signify that the team is ready to 
execute. The number two man normally also announces the number of Marines in the 
stack so that the lead Marine knows what tactics are to be employed (tactical 
responsibilities inside the room to be cleared are dependent on the number of Marines 
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entering). Without the physical bump, the verbal announcement of “You’ve got two!” 
or “You’ve got three!” was the only way to replicate this action. 
 
Figure 20: CQB Marines Entering a Room 
o Dead check: After clearing a room, the Marines conduct a “dead check” on any 
terrorists that have been shot to ensure that they are dead. This consists of sweeping 
the body for weapons and performing an “eye thump,” thumping the eyeball with a 
finger to check for any reaction. There is no procedure for replicating this in the TDS 
and it must be assumed that any terrorists that are down are dead. 
o HUTS report: After clearing the assigned area, the team consolidates and the team 
leader touches each Marine on the head (who then kneels down) to get an accurate 
accounting of the “Shooters.” This is followed by each Marine holding up a hand 
with the number of fingers extended representing the number of dead terrorists 
personally checked, with the team leader touching each Marine’s hand to get a 
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physical count of dead terrorists. Again, there is no procedure for replicating this in 
the TDS and convey the information verbally. 
Lessons Learned 
1.  Game Selection 
The personal computer-based game to be used for training must be very carefully 
selected to ensure that it satisfies not only the training goals but also the organization of and 
equipment used by the trainees. In the case of this research, the original intent was to conduct the 
experiment using a traditional Marine Corps Rifle Squad conducting MOUT. This is where the 
game F2F truly shines. However, the experiment was actually conducted with the MCSF 
Training Company conducting CQB. Because the terms MOUT and CQB are tossed about so 
casually and almost interchangeably, the important differences between the two and how they 
would affect the experiment were not captured before the conduct of the experiment. 
While MOUT can involve a wide range of operations, from patrolling to full combat, it 
tends to encompass tactics at the high-intensity end of the scale. Marine Rifle Squads, as part of 
a larger force, are called upon to plan and evaluate possible tactical operations consisting  of 
street clearing and building clearing with a great deal of force, often supported by combined 
arms (mortars, artillery, and aircraft).  Based on prior research and self-assessment scores, F2F 
appears to be as suitable as similar games in planning, evaluating, and selecting from a wide set 
of possible small unit tactical operations. The CQB implementation of the room clearing 
operations, on the other hand, tends to deal more with execution of a well honed technique 
within the set of possible military operations in urban terrain. Emphasis on execution of a 
specific technique much of which is not addressed by the game undermines its ability to directly 
contribute to success. Operations at a lower scale of combat, such as physical room clearing that 
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entail so many actual physical behaviors do not appear to be supported by this desktop game. 
Additionally, “stacking” and “bumping” are vital aspects of CQB training. Neither of these is 
supported by F2F. 
Another lesson learned is that the training should have been more consistent with the 
actual field trial. The Marine Rifle Squad is composed of thirteen Marines—three fire teams plus 
the squad leader. In the actual experiment, a MCSF team was used. These teams can vary from 
two to eight Marines and fluctuate even during an operation. During the training, teams of eight 
Marines were used; during testing, teams of four (one student and three instructors) were used. 
Further, players were equipped with weapons that were different in the training than in 
the actual field trial. The primary weapons of the rifle squad are seven M-16 rifles, three M-209 
grenade launchers (M-16 rifles with grenade launchers attached), and three M-249 squad 
automatic weapons. The primary weapon of MCSF personnel is the M-4 rifle (similar to the M-
16 but with a shorter stock) (see Figures 21 and 22). Each also carries an M-9 pistol as a back-up 
weapon, which is not accommodated in the F2F game. 
 
Figure 21: CQB Marine with M-4 Rifle 
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2.  Know the software 
While I was quite familiar with Close Combat: First to Fight, there was one setting that I 
was unaware of that impacted the training. I was unable to have all avatars in the training 
sessions use M-16 rifles, so some had to use M-209 grenade launchers (with instructions to use 
only the rifle aspect and not the grenade launcher), some had to use shotguns (which are used 
occasionally in MCSF tactics) and some had to use AK-47 rifles (little real difference in terms of 
game play but very different in appearance). With the “work arounds” there was no significant 
difference in the training conducted but there was a slight alteration in the mind set. 
3.  Computer Set-Up 
Never trust a contractor to deliver on time! Depending on a contractor to ship four 
computers to the experimentation facility almost sank the experiment. Had I not bee able to rent 
computers locally to conduct the experiment (or had I not allowed enough time for such 
contingencies), the experiment could not have been conducted. 
As a consequence of being two computers short of the planned configuration, I was 
unable to interject non-combatants into the training scenarios. The low Post-Exercise 
Questionnaire score for Rules of Engagement is undoubtedly directly attributable to this fact. 
4.  Keep the experimentation paperwork organized 
One form that was completed by the test subjects (post exposure checklist) did not have 
the subject’s identification number on it which required matching the forms together after the 
fact. 
5. Abide by the three-phase training rule 
• Mission brief and planning 
• Execution 
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• After Action Review 
Because the instructors were unfamiliar with conducting a training exercise using a PC 
game, I initially had to lead this effort. Once the instructors picked up on it and felt more 
comfortable, they were able to jump in. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
I believe that a similarly conducted research project should be performed at the 
USMC School of Infantry, Camp Geiger, North Carolina, to examine the use of Close 
Combat: First to Fight for training a standard Marine Corps rifle squad. The hypothesis 
of this recommended future research would be similar to the hypothesis of the research 
presented in this report. However, there are many conditions that vary. This research 
project would have the support of the USMC Training and Education Command, located 
in Quantico, Virginia. 
There are several reasons that I feel this would ultimately produce better results: 
• Sufficient training time. The School of Infantry has much greater experience with 
TDSs and would be better suited to incorporate a TDS into the regular curriculum, 
providing much more training time with the simulation throughout the 
curriculum. This would allow a much higher likelihood of demonstrating a 
statistically significant improvement in training. 
• Sufficient confidence in the method of instruction on the part of the instructors. 
School of Infantry instructors have seen evidence (although not scientific) of the 
validity of the type of training that this experiment was designed to demonstrate 
and will be much less hesitant to devote themselves in the full measure required to 
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conduct proper training (scenario preparation, briefing, mentoring, and 
debriefing). 
• Sufficient ability of the simulation to represent real world interactions. Without 
the need for the extreme physical interactions of CQB, the TDS should be capable 
of handling a broader range of tasks. F2F is designed around a standard USMC 
fire team which is the basis of much of the training at the School of Infantry. 
Further, there are additional items of detailed research that should be undertaken 
based upon observations made during this experiment. 
• Differences between regular gamers versus gaming novices on relative 
performance in real world tasks after game-based training. 
• The effect of instructor bias on game-based training. 
• Attitudes of trainees and instructors towards game-based training before the 
training, after the training, and after the experiment’s evaluation. 
 
Figure 22: The Drawbacks of being the Bad Guy!
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 A team of researchers under the direction of Captain J. E. Smith, USMC conducted a 
technology demonstration and data collection effort with members of the 3rd Battalion, 4th 
Marines (3/4) and supporting forces from Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms, California. 
This unit was participating in the MCWL’s Project Metropolis at the former George Air Force 
Base in Victorville, California. One phase of Project Metropolis focuses on technology 
applications and MOUT training. Prior to the demonstration, the research team selected and set 
up a networked sixteen-PC (desktop) system running Rogue Spear: Urban Operations in the 
multi-player mode. Several different scenarios (mission areas and locations) were selected for 
use. 
 
The demonstration was set up in three shifts of three hours each. One partial squad (eight 
Marines) from 1st Platoon, India Company 3/4 participated in each shift as “Blue” Forces 
(BLUFOR) and Marines from the Combat Service Support Detachment participated as the 
Opposing Forces (OPFOR). 
 
The first day was essentially a training day. Each Marine completed a profile and was 
afforded an opportunity to learn to operate the game controls and key commands and generally 
become familiar with maneuvering and performing various actions: running, squatting, shooting, 
climbing, opening doors, employing secondary weapons, etc. 
 
On the second day each squad leader was given a mission (attack or defend) in a 
designated area within the selected scenario. The philosophy was to give the squad leaders an 
opportunity to issue an operation order to the squad, carry out a reconnaissance, and execute the 
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mission. Missions normally had a time limit of twenty minutes but would often end sooner with 
one team having no survivors. The platoon sergeant and platoon commander also spent a 
considerable amount of time either participating as a squad member in the game or providing 
feedback and coaching the squad leaders and squad members. Additionally, the company 
commander spent about eight hours observing during the week and the battalion commander and 
sergeant major spent about two hours observing, returning on the fifth day with a visiting U.S. 
Senatorial staff member. 
 
One unexpected difficulty encountered was that the Marines, during the reconnaissance 
walk-through, would often go off on their own to explore and often shoot the other squad’s 
players. This was counter-productive, so on the third day the procedure was altered somewhat. 
At the beginning of each reconnaissance session, the squad leader would shoot all of his squad 
members. They could then toggle their screen views to the squad leader’s point of view and they 
could all see the same thing under the squad leader’s control. 
 
At the end of the third day, the research team determined that the Local Area Network 
(LAN) could be split into two networks on the fly. This resulted in another change to the 
procedures on the fourth day of the demonstration; the LAN would be split for the 
reconnaissance walk-through, which prevented the Marines from shooting at each other. With no 
opposing players visible, the squads were able to conduct reconnaissance and to try various 
strategies. It was noted that that most of the squad leaders (squad members often rotated as squad 
leader) had limited experience in developing fragmentary operation orders. Various members of 
the platoon and the research team (all former/retired military) began coaching them in the 
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process. Additionally, the platoon sergeant and platoon commander began using the sessions as a 
way to conduct training in the techniques and skills of maneuvering. Initially, these two factors 
were viewed as observer interference but later formed the basis of vitally important aspect of the 
video game: that the game provides a virtual training area and that the platoon leadership 
provides the training and feedback as they would in a field training evolution. 
 
On the final day, a major change in the process occurred based on the possibility that the 
trainer would be placed at the 3/4 headquarters for use as an experimental training lab for 
approximately six months. Only the infantry squads, rotating in and out in a series of round robin 
sessions, alternating between offense and defense, manned the lab. Each squad had a chance to 
play both roles in each of three mission areas. They were also given approximately 30 minutes 
(the time they were outside the rotation) to review their performance and to plan for their 
missions. The practice of splitting the LAN continued and a Mission Rehearsal session was 
incorporated to allow them to do a walk-through of their plan on the actual terrain of the mission. 
This led to a significant improvement in team execution and overall performance. The platoon 
sergeant and platoon commander continued to provide training guidance during the planning 
process. During the afternoon, the Combat Service Support teams were afforded the same 
opportunity, with the research team members providing training guidance. 
 
At the completion of each of these evolutions, a formal data collection session was 
conducted using an evaluation instrument titled “Post-Game Debrief Survey”. Written comments 
were highly encouraged and a period for verbal comments was conducted. At the completion of 
the Project Metropolis MOUT field exercises, a second formal data collection session was 
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conducted using an evaluation instrument titled “Post-Exercise Survey”. Again, written 
comments were highly encouraged. 
 
The Marines participating in the demonstration ranged in age from 18 to 33, with an 
average age of 21. They had from one to ten years of service, with an average of 2.1 years. There 
were fifteen privates first class, 14 lance corporals (plus one corpsman), ten corporals, three 
sergeants, one staff sergeant, and one second lieutenant. 
 
The Marines’ responses to the post-game debrief survey instrument (averages): 
 
How adequate was the quality of the realism of the game (resolution, graphics, 
sound) for you to execute your mission?   4.31 
 
How adequate were the maps for you to execute your mission? 
        3.92 
 
Key:  1 = Very inadequate,  2 = Inadequate,  3 = Borderline Adequate,   
4 = Generally Adequate,  5 = More than Adequate 
 
How useful do you think the (PC-based game) training system was in providing 
an opportunity for the team to improve on these skills to execute your mission(s): 
   Planning      4.36 
   Intra-Team Communications    4.13 
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   Tactical Awareness     3.97 
   Movement Techniques    3.87 
   Weapons Employment/Fire Discipline  4.05 
 
How useful do you think this (PC-based game) training system will be for 
improving your abilities in MOUT?    3.74 
The Marines’ responses to the post-exercise survey instrument (averages): 
 
How useful do you think the (PC-based game) training system was in improving 
your, or the participants’, overall ability/performance in MOUT?  
4.13 
 
How useful do you think the (PC-based game) training system was in improving 
your, or the participants’, specific MOUT skills? 
   Planning      3.60 
   Intra-team Communications    3.95 
   Tactical Awareness     3.93 
   Movement Techniques    3.85 
   Weapons Employment/Fire Discipline  3.55 
 
Key:  1 = Not at all useful,  2 = Not useful,  3 = Somewhat useful,   
4 = Useful,  5 = Very useful 
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 Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study. 
 Project title:  Cognitive Training Transfer using a Personal Computer-Based Game: A 
 Close Quarters Battle Case Study 
 
 Purpose of the research study: To determine the effectiveness of games as a training 
 system in achieving the desired transfer of skills to the actual environment. 
 
 What you will be asked to do in the study:  You will participate in Close Quarters Battle 
 training using a Tactical Decision-making Simulation (Game-based simulation). 
 
 Time required: 2 ½ hours during the Close Quarters Battle Course 
 
 Risks: Simulator Sickness. 
 
 Benefits/Compensation: Increased level of training / no monetary compensation. 
 
 Confidentiality: Your name will not be associated with the results of the study. 
 
 Voluntary participation: Yes, as part of the Close Quarters Battle Course. 
 
 Right to withdraw from the study: If you experience simulator sickness. 
 
 Whom to contact if you have questions about the study: Capt Peter Young, USMC, 
 Officer in Charge 
 
 Whom to contact about your rights in the study: Michael D. Woodman 
 
 __________ I have read the procedure described above. 
 
 __________ I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure. 
 
 _________________________________ / __________________ 








1. ID   __ __ __ __  (last 4 digits of SSN) 
2. Rank: __________ 
3. Age: __________ 
4. MOS: __________ 
5. Years in Service: 
 USMC __________ 
 Other __________ 
6. Have you ever played the following types of videogames? Do you play them regularly? 
 a. Role Playing Games     ___ Yes   ___ No  ___ Yes   ___ No 
 b. Real Time Strategy Games   ___ Yes   ___ No  ___ Yes   ___ No 
 c. First-person shooter games    ___ Yes   ___ No  ___ Yes   ___ No 
 d. Others: _______________ ___ Yes   ___ No  ___ Yes   ___ No 
7. Before this experiment, have you ever played Close Combat: First to Fight? 
  ___ Yes   ___ No 
8. Approximately how many hours a week do you play videogames? 
 _______ hours 
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Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) 
Developed by Robert S. Kennedy & colleagues under various projects. For additional information contact: 
Robert S. Kennedy, RSK Assessments, Inc., 1040 Woodcock Road, Suite 227, Orlando, FL 32803 (407) 894-5090 
 
  ID (Last 4 digits of SSN):  __ __ __ __  Date:  ____________ 
 
PRE-EXPOSURE BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. How long has it been since your last flight in an aircraft?  _____ days 
 How long has it been since your last voyage at sea?  _____ days 
 How long has it been since your last exposure in a virtual environment?  _____ days 
 
2. What experience have you had recently in a device with unusual motion? 
 
 
PRE-EXPOSURE BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
3. Are you in your usual state of fitness? (Circle one)  YES NO 
 If not, please indicate the reason: 
 
4. Have you been ill in the past week? (Circle one)   YES NO 
 If “Yes”, please indicate: 
a) The nature of the illness (Flu, cold, etc.): 
b) Severity of the illness:     Very______________ Very 
        Mild   Severe 
c) Length of illness: __________________ Hours / Days 
d) Major symptoms: 
e) Are you fully recovered?    YES NO 
 
5. How much alcohol have you consumed during the past 24 hours? 
 ____ 12 oz. cans/bottles of beer    ____ ounces wine    ____ ounces hard liquor 
 
6. Please indicate all medication you have used in the past 24 hours. If none, check the first line: 
 a)  NONE 
 b)  Sedatives or tranquilizers 
 c)  Aspirin, Tylenol, other analgesics 
 d)  Anti-histamines 
 e)  Decongestants 
 f)  Other (specify): 
 
7. a)  How many hours of sleep did you get last night? ____ hours 
 b)  Was this amount sufficient? (Circle one)   YES NO 
 
8. Please list any other comments regarding your present physical state that might affect your 
performance in our experiment. 
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Baseline (Pre) Exposure Symptom Checklist 
 
Instructions: Please fill this out BEFORE you go into the virtual environment.  Circle how much each   
  symptom below is affecting you right now.   
 
 
# Symptom Severity 
1. General discomfort None Slight Moderate Severe 
2. Fatigue None Slight Moderate Severe 
3. Boredom None Slight Moderate Severe 
4. Drowsiness None Slight Moderate Severe 
5. Headache None Slight Moderate Severe 
6. Eye strain None Slight Moderate Severe 
7. Difficulty focusing None Slight Moderate Severe 
8a. Salivation increased None Slight Moderate Severe 
8b. Salivation decreased None Slight Moderate Severe 
9. Sweating None Slight Moderate Severe 
10. Nausea None Slight Moderate Severe 
11. Difficulty concentrating None Slight Moderate Severe 
12. Mental depression None Slight Moderate Severe 
13. “Fullness of the head” None Slight Moderate Severe 
14. Blurred Vision None Slight Moderate Severe 
15a. Dizziness with eyes open None Slight Moderate Severe 
15b. Dizziness with eyes closed None Slight Moderate Severe 
16. *Vertigo None Slight Moderate Severe 
17. **Visual flashbacks None Slight Moderate Severe 
18. Faintness None Slight Moderate Severe 
19. Aware of breathing None Slight Moderate Severe 
20. ***Stomach  awareness None Slight Moderate Severe 
21. Loss of appetite None Slight Moderate Severe 
22. Increased appetite None Slight Moderate Severe 
23. Desire to move bowels None Slight Moderate Severe 
24. Confusion None Slight Moderate Severe 
25. Burping None Slight Moderate Severe 
26. Vomiting None Slight Moderate Severe 
27. Other  
 
 
* Vertigo is experienced as loss of orientation with respect to vertical upright. 
** Visual illusion of movement or false sensations of movement, when not in the simulator, car, or aircraft. 
*** Stomach awareness is usually used to indicate a feeling of discomfort which is just short of nausea. 
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POST 00 Minutes Exposure Symptom Checklist 
 
 ID (Last 4 digits of SSN): _ _ _ _   Date:  _______________ 
 
Instructions: Circle how much each symptom below is affecting you right now.   
 
# Symptom Severity 
1. General discomfort None Slight Moderate Severe 
2. Fatigue None Slight Moderate Severe 
3. Boredom None Slight Moderate Severe 
4. Drowsiness None Slight Moderate Severe 
5. Headache None Slight Moderate Severe 
6. Eye strain None Slight Moderate Severe 
7. Difficulty focusing None Slight Moderate Severe 
8a. Salivation increased None Slight Moderate Severe 
8b. Salivation decreased None Slight Moderate Severe 
9. Sweating None Slight Moderate Severe 
10. Nausea None Slight Moderate Severe 
11. Difficulty concentrating None Slight Moderate Severe 
12. Mental depression None Slight Moderate Severe 
13. “Fullness of the head” None Slight Moderate Severe 
14. Blurred Vision None Slight Moderate Severe 
15a. Dizziness with eyes open None Slight Moderate Severe 
15b. Dizziness with eyes closed None Slight Moderate Severe 
16. *Vertigo None Slight Moderate Severe 
17. **Visual flashbacks None Slight Moderate Severe 
18. Faintness None Slight Moderate Severe 
19. Aware of breathing None Slight Moderate Severe 
20. ***Stomach  awareness None Slight Moderate Severe 
21. Loss of appetite None Slight Moderate Severe 
22. Increased appetite None Slight Moderate Severe 
23. Desire to move bowels None Slight Moderate Severe 
24. Confusion None Slight Moderate Severe 
25. Burping None Slight Moderate Severe 
26. Vomiting None Slight Moderate Severe 
27. Other  
 
* Vertigo is experienced as loss of orientation with respect to vertical upright. 
** Visual illusion of movement or false sensations of movement, when not in the simulator, car, or aircraft. 




1. While in the virtual environment, did you get the feeling of motion (i.e., did you experience a compelling 
sensation of self motion as though you were actually moving)? (Circle one) 
 
   YES  NO  SOMEWHAT 
 
2. On a scale of 1 (POOR) to 10 (EXCELLENT) rate your performance in the virtual environment: 
 
3. a. Did any unusual events occur during your exposure? (Circle one) YES NO 
 b. If YES, please describe 
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1. ID   __ __ __ __  (last 4 digits of SSN) 
 
2. Role:  ___ Student     ___ Instructor     ___ Staff     ___ Observer 
 

















6. How useful do you think the Tactical Decision-making Simulation was in providing an opportunity for students to 
improve on these skills to execute the mission? 
     Rules of Engagement 
     Weapons Employment 
     Movement Techniques 
     Tactical Awareness 
     Intra-Team Communications 
     Situational Awareness 
     Planning 
Very UsefulUseful Neutral Not very 
useful 










Subj ID Rank Age MOS Years in Service 
Role Playing 
Games RTS Games FPS Games Others CC: F2F Hrs / 
    USMC Other Ever Regularly Ever Regularly Ever Regularly Ever Regularly Ever Week 
                
7139 E3 20 0311 1.2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 
4451 E3 19 0311 1.5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0   0 20 
4789 E3 19 0311 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1   1 10 
8203 E3 20 0311 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (Racing) 1 1 10 
6833 E2 21 0311 1  1 0 1 0 1 0   0 2 
4920 E3 20 0311 1.5  0 0 0 0 1 0   0 1 
9060 E3 22 0311 1  1 1 1 1 1 1   1 3 
3692 E2 19 0311 1  1 0 1 0 1 0   1 1 
2007 E3 19 0331 1.5  1 0 1 1 1 1 1 (Sports) 1 1 3.5 
8476 E3 19 0311 1.4  1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 
0161 E3 19 0311 1  1 0 1 0 1 0   1 2 
8573 E3 19 0311 1  1 0 1 0 1 0   1 1 
5846 E2 19 0311 1  1  1  1    0 5 
2085  19 0351 1.5  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8927 E3 19 0311 1  1 0 1 1 1 1   1 4 
4179 E3 20 0311 1.5  1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
       
Average  19.56  1.19375 0 88% 20% 81% 40% 100% 40% 33% 60% 56% 4.4375 
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Subject ID Hallway 5 Step Immed Shot Shot Door Dead Proper Tactical Reload Stairwell 
 Coord Entry Action Delivery Placement Check Check Marking Advantage   
            
7139 -2 -2     -1 -1 -2   
4451 -2 -2         -1 
4789 -2  -1   -1 -1 -1 -3   
8203 -2 -2 -2   -1  -1 -2  -2 
6833 -2 -2    -1  -1 -1   
4920 -2 -2     -2 -1 -1   
9060 -2      -1 -1 -2   
3692 -2  -2     -1 -1 -1  
2007 -2        -1  -1 
8476            
0161 -2     -1 -1     
8573 -2 -2    -1 -2  -2   
5846 -2 -1     -1 -1 -2  -1 
2085 -2 -1    -2 -2 -1 -1   
8927 -2     -1 -1  -3   
4179            
            
Control 1 -2 -2    -1 -2 -1 -3   
Control 2            
Control 3 -2 -1 -1   -1 -1  -2   
Control 4 -2 -3    -1 -2 -1 -1   
Control 5 -2 -2    -1 -1     
Control 6 -2 -2         -2 
Control 7 -2 -1  -2  -1 -2  -3  -1 
Control 8  -2         -2 
Control 9 -2 -2   -8    -1 -1  
Control 10 -2 -1     -2  -2  -1 
Control 11 -2 -1    -1  -1 -1   
Control 12            
Control 13            
Control 14            
Control 15            













w/ Security Evacuate 
 Secure Strongpoint SitRep Grd Force Chng Over Evacuate DM Shooter Asslt Force 
          
7139 -2 0 0 -1    -1  
4451 0 0 -1       
4789 0 0 0 -1  -1 -1   
8203 0 0 -1 -1 -1  -1 -2  
6833 -2 0 -1     -3  
4920 0 0 0       
9060 0 0 0    -1   
3692 -2 0 0     -3  
2007 -2 0 0     -3  
8476          
0161 0 0 -1       
8573 0 0 -1     -3  
5846 -3 -1 -1     -3  
2085 -2 -1 -1       
8927 0 0 -1     -3  
4179          
          
Control 1          
Control 2 -2 0 -1     -3  
Control 3          
Control 4 0 0 -1       
Control 5 0 0 0     -3  
Control 6 0 0 -1 -1      
Control 7 -2 0 0     -1  
Control 8 0 0 -1     -3  
Control 9 -1 0 -2     -3 -1 
Control 10 0 0 -1     -3  
Control 11 0 0 -1       
Control 12 -2 -1 0 -1    -1  
Control 13          
Control 14          
Control 15          












 Discharge  Trigger at Index on Fire Decock 6' Rule 
        
7139      -10  
4451      -10  
4789        
8203        
6833        
4920   -15     
9060      -10  
3692        
2007     -5   
8476        
0161        
8573        
5846        
2085      -10  
8927        
4179        
        
Control 1        
Control 2      -10  
Control 3  F      
Control 4      -10  
Control 5        
Control 6        
Control 7        
Control 8        
Control 9        
Control 10        
Control 11        
Control 12     -5   
Control 13        
Control 14        
Control 15        




Subject ID Tactical Rank Safety Total Rank 
 Score  Violations Score  
      
7139 87 7.5 -10 77 10.5 
4451 94 23 -10 84 18 
4789 88 11  88 24.5 
8203 82 1.5  82 14.5 
6833 87 7.5  87 22 
4920 92 20.5 -15 77 10.5 
9060 93 22 -10 83 16 
3692 88 11  88 24.5 
2007 91 17.5 -5 86 20 
8476   F X 2 0 4.5 
0161 95 24  95 32 
8573 87 7.5  87 22 
5846 84 4.5  84 18 
2085 88 11 -10 78 12 
8927 89 14  89 27 
4179   F X 2 0 4.5 
 88.93 13.04  74.06 17.53 
Control 1    84.642857  
Control 2 83 3 -10 73 9 
Control 3   F 0 4.5 
Control 4 91 17.5 -10 81 13 
Control 5 87 7.5  87 22 
Control 6 92 20.5  92 31 
Control 7 91 17.5  91 29.5 
Control 8 84 4.5  84 18 
Control 9 89 14  89 27 
Control 10 82 1.5  82 14.5 
Control 11 91 17.5  91 29.5 
Control 12 89 14 -5 89 27 
Control 13   F X 2 0 4.5 
Control 14   F X 2 0 4.5 
Control 15   F X 2 0 4.5 
Control 16   F X 2 0 4.5 
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